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1 Introduction
In this study, we examine a framework that brings together two classic paradigms in accounting
theory: the first paradigm is that of ex-ante design of measurement systems or persuasion, in which
a company board or an accounting regulator chooses a measurement that controls what information
is collected and reported; the second paradigm is that of strategic voluntary disclosure, such that
management may, after receiving unfavorable information, choose to withhold unfavorable news.
Both paradigms are relevant to accounting questions given that the practice of accounting fea-
tures choices about how to measure transactions and what to report about the measurement. As a
continuing motivating example for our analysis, consider the problem of measuring an asset which
may have gained or lost value. The firm’s accounting standards specify which measurements are
conducted during the operating cycle. The process of valuing assets is not straightforward because
on occasion, the firm may not always be able to know or show verifiable evidence about changes
in value. In the case of a patent, there may not be information about the future cash flows from
exploiting the patent; in the case of a property or a private business, no recently traded compara-
bles may be available; in the case of inventories, the firm may be unsure as to whether a decline in
demand is permanent or temporary, etc.
Uncertainty about whether the measurement has or has not produced information to be reported
in the financial statements creates strategic incentives to withhold information. Specifically, at
the end of the accounting cycle, management receives what information has been gathered, if
any. Even if evidence has been received that would trigger an impairment test, management may
exert discretion not to make this evidence public. Alternatively, we can think about the output of
the information gathering stage as information that is initially soft (Gao and Liang 2018). The
accounting system makes some of the information hard by collecting the supporting evidence (Ijiri
1975; Bertomeu and Marinovic 2015).
Whatever information the measurement produces affects withholding incentives. Understand-
ing this interaction is the objective of this study. Naturally, our model applies to a variety of em-
pirical settings with (a) control over what information is collected, (b) uncertainty about whether
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the event has occurred or there is information to be collected. We briefly discuss a few illustrations
below - while our model is not intended as descriptive of the institutional details of each of these
examples, the settings are meant to offer applications in which the trade-off discussed here would
likely be at play.
First, a firm may implement a finer accounting system that brings about information about the
occurrence of past misstatements (Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan 2011): for example, this may be
achieved in the form of internal controls (Marinovic 2013) including recurrent reviews and checks
on past transactions, hiring more effective auditors or increasing oversight by boards (Laux 2010).
The market does not know whether such evidence has been received, and the manager may decide
to conduct the restatement based on the potential impact on earnings or any further reputational
consequence. Or, the firm may conduct a restatement stealthily, within venues that make it less
forthcoming to market participants (Files, Swanson and Tse 2009). Management must make a
choice whether to report information about a misstatement event to an outside party, but have no
simple means to report the absence of the event.
Second, the economic trade-offs may be considered in the context of disclosure of material
events, which are in principle required in the US as a filing of form 8-K. In principle, any signifi-
cant material event should be reported but, in practice, many events may or may not be objectively
considered material, and firms can be strategic as to which events to file, or when to file (Li 2013).
The reporting policy of the firm will be a function of how much operational information is col-
lected and transmitted into the financial reporting system. In addition, many material events that
could be reported in these filings contain proprietary information, which firms can choose to redact
(Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Heinle, Samuels and Taylor 2018).
Third, the design of the measurement system may interact with accounting measurement, but
need not concern only accounting related events. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for-
bids U.S. companies to engage in bribery of foreign officials. Monetary transfers in the process of
bribing can, however, be uncovered by accounting internal controls and, therefore, the quality of
the accounting system will determine a firm’s ability to detect whether its employees violate the
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provisions of the FCPA (Cooper, Ho, Hunter and Rodgers 1985). More generally, the quality of
the measurement system chosen by the company will allow firms to know whether an illegal act
has been committed by an employee. Rogue trading events (Barings, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale), failures
to report an environmental violation (Volkswagen) or alleged ignorance of frauds by the Chairman
(Enron) are among many examples in which management may have received coarse information
from internal measurements.
Within this context, we ask two questions, which we believe to be steps to form a joint the-
ory of optimal measurements and strategic withholding. First, how do we design measurements
in the presence of strategic withholding incentives? According to one perspective, we may not
need to incorporate strategic considerations into the measurement process if we can rely on volun-
tary channels to supply information efficiently to the market. Second, how does the existence of
the measurement alter the voluntary disclosure environment? We expect very different disclosure
behaviors if measurements are precise than if they are imprecise with limited verifiable informa-
tion. Our purpose is thus to merge the two streams of literature into a theory which speaks about
financial reports as a choice of reporting mechanisms constrained by strategic reporting choices.
Before we discuss our main results, we lay out the channels for the interaction between the
measurement and voluntary disclosure. Precise measurements can counter-intuitively increase
incentives to strategically withhold and reduce information. To understand why, suppose that
the measurement always obtains precise information about the asset when there exists verifiable
information. We know from a vast literature in voluntary disclosure theory that the disclosure
threshold will be obtained by comparing (i) the expected value of the asset as assessed by the
market when withholding to (ii) the value obtained by the marginal firms in possession of the asset
value that choose to disclose that value. By construction, the marginal discloser will be the lowest
asset value above the withholding threshold, and thus a precise measurement creates less incentive
to disclose.
Suppose that, by contrast, the measurement is imprecise above the disclosure threshold and
the information collected by the measurement does not allow the market to know the exact actual
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asset value of the marginally disclosed report. Then, the marginal disclosers will compare the non-
disclosure price to an expectation over a subset of asset values located above the threshold: this
expectation is greater than the threshold signal and, subsequently raises the benefit of disclosure.
But there is a downside to this type of measurement: while the set of withheld measurements nar-
rows, the information revealed by marginal disclosers has become more imprecise. In summary,
more precision over withholding firms comes at the cost of increasing imprecision over the dis-
closing firms. This creates a trade-off in choosing the ideal precision of the measurement whose
resolution is non-trivial.
We formalize this trade-off theoretically and analyze whether the design of the measurement
can improve efficiency in a setting where the firm makes better decisions when public information
is more precise. We expect from the trade-off that, in general, the preferred measurement may
depend on the value of information, the distribution of the asset values, and the frictions relating
to the possible absence of information.
Interestingly, the preferred measurement may collapse to a straightforward measurement if un-
certainty about information endowment is the only friction. Within the models of Dye (1985) and
by Jung and Kwon (1988), extended to include a choice of measurement and a productive bene-
fit of information, no imprecise measurement would do better than a fully-precise measurement
even though imprecise measurements reduce strategic withholding. We delay a complete argu-
ment for this result in text and offer here a simple heuristic intuition. The solution to the voluntary
disclosure problem prescribes an indifference condition that equates the expectation conditional
on non-disclosure to the expectation of the marginal disclosers. When this equality holds, the
measurement cannot create dispersion in posterior expectations between withholding firms and
marginal disclosers. Without additional dispersion in posterior expectations, a measurement that
reclassifies some withholding firms into marginal disclosers creates no useful information.
We relax next a key restriction central to this result and develop a more nuanced answer to
the problem. We show, in a framework with both uncertainty about information endowment (Dye
1985; Jung and Kwon 1988) and private costs of disclosure (Verrecchia 1983), that there is always
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some benefit to imprecision for any non-zero disclosure cost or benefit. This framework captures
common situations in which information revealed in detailed accounting reports may be used by a
different party (a regulatory agency, employees, competitors, consumers, etc.) transferring value
from the firm to the other parties. This creates a misalignment between private and social value
of information. As management privately bears the cost, the disclosure threshold still equates the
payoff from withholding to the payoff from the marginal discloser. In turn, the market expectation
conditional on non-disclosure must be lower than the market expectation for the marginal discloser.
Therefore, the measurement now generates useful information in the form of different posterior
expectations.
Next, we lift the assumption that it would be desirable for the measurement, absent any other
friction, to increase the amount of information available. Addressing this question requires addi-
tional institutional details about the use of information and we choose here a simple model that
captures a possible use of information in debt contracts. Specifically, we embed voluntary disclo-
sure into the collateral financing model of Goex and Wagenhofer (2009), where the firm must meet
a minimum asset value in order to finance a project. In this environment, some imprecision for
the marginal discloser is desirable as long as the collateral requirement becomes sufficiently large
and the probability of receiving information is low. Intuitively, the measurement is designed so
that precise measurements are more likely to be voluntarily disclosed over favorable asset values.
However, some imprecision for intermediate asset values is used to raise the perceived value of the
asset as collateral. Imprecision increases in the probability that information is received.
Literature review. Our study is closely related to two streams of the literature: studies that
focus on the structure of the information environment as a determinant of disclosure behavior and
studies that focus on the optimal provision of information with real effects.
As to the first stream of literature, the informational environment faced by firms before they re-
lease information will affect the type and amount of information that is released. This is a key facet
of our analysis and is discussed in papers such as Einhorn (2005, 2017) and Heinle and Verrecchia
(2015). Einhorn (2005) considers an environment in which the value of the firm is updated using
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two pieces of information, one public and one private, showing that the presence of mandatory dis-
closures alters the incentives to report news voluntarily. Heinle and Verrecchia (2015) argue that
the aggregate expected number of firms making commitments to disclosure affects individual in-
centives to commit to disclose, implying that the aggregate environment and individual disclosures
are jointly determined. The study by Einhorn (2017) is another example in which the existence of
a source information competing with voluntary disclosure affects the amount of disclosure.
Within this literature, we are aware of few studies in which the regulatory environment is
itself considered as an optimal choice. In order to consider optimal regulatory choice, we thus
need to link our paper back to an extensive pre-existing literature on real effects, which (in its
most inclusive definition) refers to environments in which information interacts with real operating
decisions (Kanodia 1980; Kanodia and Sapra 2016) and which gives us a rigorous formulation of
how properties of a measurement map to a specified objective. This is an active area of literature
that is far too broad to make even an attempt toward a comprehensive discussion but some of the
recent literature is relevant to our problem.
The paper by Kanodia, Singh and Spero (2005) is most similar to our setting, as it focuses
on the optimal choice of imprecision in a noisy signaling problem; a key difference between the
context of their paper and our setting is that they do not focus on ex-post incentives to withhold
information. In addition, imprecision in their setting takes the form of garbling information while,
in our model, it is localized pooling at the lowest disclosure. In Gao and Zhang (2018), the firm
makes a commitment to internal control processes which is affected by economy-wide information
revealed by other firms. This, in turn, implies that, absent regulation, a firm will under-weigh the
value of information and under-invest in its internal controls. The studies by Goex andWagenhofer
(2009), Lu and Sapra (2009), Beyer and Guttman (2012), Gao and Liang (2013) are other recent
examples that reveal how information has real effects, although by and large, they focus on either
voluntary disclosure or measurement rules but not their interactions.
Our work is part of persuasion theory, which considers the design of a measurement system as
a mechanism that prescribes which information is collected and reported. Within this literature, the
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studies by Goex and Wagenhofer (2009), Bertomeu and Cheynel (2015), Huang (2016), Michaeli
(2017) and Jiang and Yang (2017) bring insights from this literature into the design of measure-
ments that increase efficiency. Within this literature, a few recent studies focus on interaction
between persuasion and reporting incentives, including Friedman, Hughes and Michaeli (2015),
Bertomeu, Vaysman and Xue (2016) and Quigley and Walther (2018) which develop settings in
which public information can crowd out or increase the supply of inside information. A main
difference between these models and ours is that, in these models, public information and private
disclosures are about different pieces of information. In our model, the persuasion mechanism is
the input to the voluntary disclosure.
Two papers are most closely related to ours, in the sense that they focus on persuasion as in-
put to a disclosure decision. Hummel, Morgan and Stocken (2016) focus on a class of problems,
in which shareholders can directly set a disclosure policy. With risk-seeking preferences, which
closely map to our convex payoff function, they show that the sender prefers full-information. They
do not focus on incentives for strategic withholding if the manager may not receive information,
which is the main focus of our model. Another related study is by DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzy-
pacz (2017), which likes us, focuses on a persuasion mechanism as input to what is disclosed.
They interpret the choice of measurement in terms of an ex-ante test design, but their question
is somewhat different. In their model, the agent privately chooses a test before being informed
and the chosen test is not known conditional on non-disclosure. They show that even without the
social value of information, the resulting test is one that meets the minimum principle (Acharya,
DeMarzo and Kremer 2011; Guttman, Kremer and Skrzypacz 2014) that would minimize posterior
expectations conditional on non-disclosure.
Two recent papers, while they do not focus on the persuasion mechanism per se, speak to the
embedded forces in voluntary disclosure that make the mechanism approach potentially desirable.
Glode, Opp and Zhang (2018) examine a sender’s disclosure to a monopoly, trading off the gains
from trade versus the monopoly’s incentive to extract the surplus. As in our model, there are
potential benefits from imprecise disclosures. Rappoport (2017) shows that the changes in the
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distribution of the information that make the sender less certain about the information translate into
lower skepticism by the receiver, and would in many settings increase disclosure. In our model,
the mechanism partially controls this skepticism to affect the equilibrium level of disclosure.
2 The model
2.1 Players, Strategies and Payoffs
Our model involves three players: a sender, a receiver, and a designer. For expositional pur-
poses, we use the interpretation of a firm measuring an asset and the state of nature as the asset
value. We refer to the designer as the regulator (e.g., a standard-setter), the sender as the manager
and the receiver as a capital market forming posterior expectations about the asset value. There
is uncertainty about both the asset value and about whether verifiable information regarding the
asset exists. The regulator wants to increase communication to the receiver but the sender may
strategically withhold to increase the investors’ posterior expectation about the asset value.
The timeline is as follows. At time τ = 0, the regulator chooses a measurement system. At
τ = 1, the measurement system produces a signal about the asset value whenever it can be mea-
sured. The choice of the measurement system is observable to all players. At τ = 2, if verifiable
information exists, the manager privately observes the signal and chooses whether to disclose it
to investors. At τ = 3, conditional on public information, the investors take an action that affects
both the sender and the regulator payoffs. We are interested in the design of a measurement system
that maximizes the ex ante payoff of the designer, taking into account the sequentially rational
voluntary disclosure decision and market price. Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events.
Distributional assumptions. The firm owns an asset whose value V is random with realizations
v in the support V ≡ [0, v], where v > 0.1 For instance, one can think about the asset as a
retail location, currently owned by the firm, that may serve a role in operations. Let F denote the
1Throughout, we use a capital letter, V , to denote a random variable and a small letter, v, to denote its realization.
Proofs and results apply to distributions with unbounded support.
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τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3r r r r
Regulator chooses
measurement G.
With probability q, no
information exists; with prob.
1− q, manager privately
receives a realization
of signal X , drawn from G.
Manager chooses
whether to disclose X or
to withhold; uninformed
manager stays silent.
Manager forms posterior
expectation E(V |X = x);
Regulator obtains payoff
φ(E(V |X = x)).
Figure 1: Timeline
distribution function of V . We assume that the distribution of V admits a p.d.f. f that is strictly
positive on the support.
As in Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988), there is uncertainty about whether verifiable
information about V exists.2 Lack of verifiable information occurs when no information exists or,
if it exists, when it cannot be collected and reported credibly (i.e., when information is soft). It
may be that, with some probability, there are no comparables to measure the value of a property or
a new retail location has not yet generated verifiable long-term sales. We denote by q ∈ (0, 1) the
probability that there does not exist verifiable information about the asset value.
The measurement system. As in the persuasion literature (Aumann and Maschler, 1995; Ka-
menica and Gentzkow, 2011), we assume that a measurement is a mechanism that controls which
information is received by the manager. This measurement could represent prescriptions from
accounting rules, internal procedures for collecting information from the field, or long-term ac-
counting choice made by the firm. Given a distribution over states of nature F , a measurement
system induces a distribution G over posterior means if and only if F is a mean-preserving spread
of G (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2016).3 The measurement system chosen thus generates a ran-
dom variable X , distributed according to G. Because, in our model, only posterior expectations
about the asset affect preferences, we can simplify notation by writing each signal X as a posterior
2Note that we expose the model somewhat more generally than Dye (1985), to the extent that our assumption
is about the objective presence of (verifiable) information that could be used by the persuasion mechanism. In Dye
(1985), by contrast, when information exists about the asset value, it is always verifiable.
3F is a mean-preserving spread ofG if
∫ v
0
φ(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ v
0
φ(x)dG(x) for all convex functions φ or, equivalently,
if these distributions have equal means and
∫ x
0
F (y)dy ≥ ∫ x
0
G(y)dy for all x ∈ V .
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expectation about V and restrict G to distributions over the support of X .4
When G = F , the signal yields the same distribution of posterior means as the asset value
itself, that is, the signal X is equal to the asset value V almost surely. This measurement is
precise, because it reveals the asset value without noise whenever verifiable information about it
exists. As to imprecise signals, we do not impose any restriction on the measurement noise. When
information does not exist (with probability q), the measurement cannot generate any information,
as formalized in the notations below.
Strategy and beliefs. Let Ω denote the random information endowment of the firm. When a
firm does not receive verifiable information (Ω = ∅), it must choose nondisclosure and cannot
convey credibly not to possess any such information. On the other hand, when a firm receives
verifiable information X = x (Ω = x), it can report X truthfully or stay silent to pretend that
no verifiable information exists, which we refer to as (strategic) withholding.5 It could be the
case, for example, that the measurement detects that the asset lost value but management passes
on a possible impairment arguing to external parties that no such adverse information has been
received.
For a given measurement system G selected by the regulator, a strategy for the firm is thus a
function r(ω; G) that maps the firm’s private information into a report.6 Let r denote the firm’s
public report (i.e., its disclosure decision), with r = (d, x) standing for disclosure of the posterior
mean x and r = nd standing for non-disclosure. When information does not exist, r = nd.7 A
4Specifically, for any signal X , we can use a signal structure that yields the same actions and payoffs X ′ =
E(V |X). In our model, this signal structure equates the signal to the action taken by the receiver (Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2011).
5We have left aside here manipulation incentives to keep our arguments as transparent as possible but, as noted
by Einhorn and Ziv (2011), manipulation can be incorporated as an invertible bias into a more general model. An
interesting question is whether misreporting costs would create another channel for imprecise measurement to increase
value. Guttman, Kadan and Kandel (2006) demonstrate an idea close to this concept by showing that pooling equilibria
in misreporting problems can imply higher ex ante value.
6We adopt the tie-breaking convention that indifferences between disclosure and nondisclosure are resolved in
favor of disclosure. The tie-breaker is inconsequential when the set of marginal disclosers has mass zero. When the
marginal disclosers do not have mass zero, this tie-breaker is consistent with the notion that the regulator can slightly
perturb the measurement system in such a way as to induce disclosure.
7 It is critical for the model that the manager cannot, at no cost, gather information that does not exist - or else
a fully-precise measurement would be used. As many of our examples show, it is not just plausible, but practically
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given disclosure strategy generates a random variable, R, whose realization, R = r, is the public
report that the market observes.
A market belief is a function μ(r; G) that maps a report into a posterior expectation about the
asset value.
Social value of information. To model the real effects of information, we assume that the firm
may make operational decisions as a function of the market’s assessment of the asset value, e.g.,
make investments, draw on external funds, and so forth. We assume that the market values the
entire firm at φ(μ(r; G)), where the function φ is increasing, convex, and twice continuously dif-
ferentiable. This assumption can be rephrased as stating that the ex ante expected value of the
firm, E (φ(μ(R; G))) is greater when the market has more precise information in the sense of
mean-preserving spreads.
Below, we provide a simple micro foundation that yields conditions such that (i) the maximiza-
tion of value yields a convex function, and (ii) this function is a function of posterior expectations.
Suppose that, after the realized report r is observed, the firm makes an investment decision k in
order to maximize the market price E(V k − ψ(k)|r), where V can be interpreted as productivity
and ψ is an investment cost with ψ(0) = ψ′(0) = 0 and ψ′′ > 0 captures decreasing returns to
scale.89 Differentiating the objective function with respect to investment k to obtain the optimal
investment,
k∗(E (V |r)) ≡ (ψ′)−1(E (V |r)). (1)
interpretable, that not all information could be gathered and it is a building block of the widely-used Dye (1985) and
Jung and Kwon (1988) approaches to model this in terms of a binary event - not for sake of descriptive realism but to
convey intuitions. There are cases in which an outside expert would not be able to assess a precise valuation, regardless
of how much documentation is provided (consider the problem of valuing an equity stake), or cases where there is
evidence (consider valuation with a trade of a comparable asset). Generalizing this model to any possible type of
costly information acquisition or partial information endowment is not the point of our paper. Further, endogenizing
the probability of information endowment with some additional costly process would have little bearing on our main
trade-offs.
8The claim can be made slightly more general, as we can assume a value of the firm h(V )ν(k)−ψ(k) and change
variables to set k′ = ν(k) and V ′ = h(V ).
9Observe that the firm only cares about the market’s expectation of the cash flow, and not about the actual cash flow.
As a result, there is no mechanism for the firm to signal its private information through the choice of the investment
level, because the objective function does not depend directly on the realized X (e.g., see Brandenburger and Polak,
1996).
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Reinjecting this investment into the firm’s market price yields a market price that is a function of
the posterior expectation about V , that is, letting x = E (V |r) denote the posterior expectation,
φ(x) ≡ xk∗(x)− ψ(k∗(x)).
Differentiating twice the equilibrium firm value φ(x) yields that φ′′(x) = 1/ψ′′(k∗(x)). Hence,
the convexity of the function φ(∙) directly captures the returns to scale. In the special case of
quadratic diseconomies of scale ψ(k) = k2, firm value is quadratic as well, φ(x) = x2/4, and the
ex-ante expectation of firm value is
E (φ(X)) =
1
4
[
VG (X) + E (V )2
]
.
The ex ante expected firm value in the quadratic cost case thus increases as the informativeness of
disclosures increases, where informativeness is measured by the variance of the market’s posterior
expectation of the asset value.
2.2 Equilibrium
We are now in a position to state our equilibrium concept. The definition is split into two parts.
Definition 1 concerns the equilibrium of the voluntary disclosure subgame, after the regulator’s
choice of the measurement system. Definition 2 describes what constitutes an optimal measure-
ment in this setting.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium of the disclosure subgame) For a given measurement system G, an
equilibrium of the voluntary disclosure subgame is given by a reporting function, r(ω; G), and a
market’s assessment of the asset value, μ(r; G), such that:
(i) Given the firm’s reporting function r(ω; G), the market’s assessment μ(r; G) is the posterior
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expectation of the asset value given Bayes’ rule, that is,
μ(r; G) = E (V |R = r) ;
(ii) Given the market’s assessment μ(r; G), the firm’s reporting function maximizes the firm’s
payoff, that is,
r(ω; G) =

nd if ω = ∅
(d, x) if ω = x and φ(x) ≥ φ(μnd)
nd if ω = x and φ(x) < φ(μnd)
,
where μnd = E(V |R = nd).
This definition is standard: the market posterior expectation must follow Bayes rule (i) and the
manager discloses only when informed and when the price is lower conditional on non-disclosure.
Since the measurement system affects the disclosure strategy and the ex ante expected firm
value only through the distribution of posterior means that it induces, G, the regulator directly
maximizes over measurable signal distributions.
Definition 2 (Optimal measurement) An equilibrium measurement G∗ is optimal if it solves
max
G
E (φ(μ(r(Ω; G)))))
s.t. F is a mean-preserving spread of G,
where r(ω; G) and μ(r; G) are equilibrium strategies for the firm and the market, respectively, in
the voluntary disclosure subgame.
We say that a measurement is optimal if it maximizes the ex-ante value of the firm. Note that
because prices φ(μ(r(Ω; G)) are convex in the posterior expectation μ(r(Ω; G), we know that the
regulator would always prefer a fully precise measurement if all information could be disclosed,
that is, if q = 0. In this case, the conditions for unravelling hold (Viscusi 1978) and the manager’s
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report is fully informative about the outcome of the measurement. If q > 0, strategic withholding
will occur on the equilibrium path, implying a control over the measurement is not equivalent to
control over the voluntary signal that the market receives.
To keep the exposition simple, we will develop the analysis in-text in the special case of “inter-
val” measurements, which we define precisely in the Definition that follows (Definition 3) but first
describe it intuitively. In Appendix B, we show that interval measurements are optimal within the
broad class of measurements in Definition 2 but the proof is long and technical and adds limited
economic intuition.
An interval measurement is such that the information received by the manager is either in
the form of an interval with the form [ai, ai+1), or reveals full information about the true state
in the form of a full-disclosure region VFI . We further economize notation by restricting the at-
tention to measurements in which the full-information region is either empty or a single interval,
VFI ≡ [aj , aj+1), and without loss of generality set the lowest interval [0, a1) equal to the with-
holding region.10 An interval measurement is fully described by M = (VFI , (ai)Ii=0), with a
specification of the (possibly-empty) fully-revealing region VFI and the set of interval information
sets [ai, ai+1) 6= VFI associated to the measurement.
Definition 3 (Convex-partitional measurement) A measurement G is convex-partitional if there
exists M = (VFI , (ai)Ii=0), with {ai} an increasing sequence from a0 = 0 to aI = v, such that
either (i) X = E(v|v ∈ [ai, ai+1)) for all v ∈ [ai, ai+1) or (ii) X = v for all v ∈ VFI ≡ [aj , aj+1).
2.3 Discussion
Several assumptions, which we discuss at greater length below, are critical for our model.
Ex-ante measurement system design. As in most of the persuasion literature, a measurement in
our model describes which information is collected by an accounting system whose characteristics
are known to outsiders (e.g., long-term policies, accounting standards, etc.). The collection of
10This is without loss of generality as also shown in part of our main proof of optimality in Appendix B.
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information begins prior to economic uncertainty being realized, typically during the operating
cycle and, if management were to receive additional private information at the end of a reporting
period, this information would be soft and no longer be credibly reportable. The model may,
therefore, not be a fit for activities that occur exclusively at the end of a reporting period, especially
in environments where management chooses a measurement with private information about what
the measurement would deliver. In our model, it is the regulator who chooses a measurement and
does so without knowing the value of the asset and incentives to increase ex-post market values.
By contrast, with purely ex-post choice over the measurement system, the unravelling principle
would hold and management would face skeptical expectations when choosing anything but a
fully-informative measurement.11
Uncertainty about existence of verifiable information. The measurement in our model is con-
strained by the existence of verifiable information. In particular, even a fully-precise measurement
will fail to deliver a reportable signal if verifiable information does not exist. This assumption
broadly follows the framework of Ijiri (1975) which views the accounting process as making cer-
tain pieces of information hard but notes that not all information can be so incorporated into the
accounting process. We give various examples in the introduction of soft information that could
not easily be documented to yield verifiable measurements.
As such, a key assumption in our study is that information can take two forms: information
that cannot be measured (entirely soft or subjective) and information that can be measured, e.g.,
for which there is collectable or verifiable evidence. The occurrence of the friction in our model
and the chosen measurement jointly determine the information endowment of the manager. For
obvious reasons (both conceptual and practical), we assume that a measurement cannot collect
verifiable information when it does not exist. Of note, the subset of results pertaining to optimal
imprecision in Sections 3.2 and 4.1 (with privately-borne disclosure or withholding costs) apply
11Note that we are not the only study focusing on measurement system design and there is a very extensive prior
literature in which measurements are chosen prior to receipt of private information, see Arya, Glover and Sivaramakr-
ishnan (1997), Kanodia, Singh and Spero (2005) or Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra and Venugopalan (2014), among many
other examples.
16
even if we assume that measurable evidence always exists (q = 0).
Social value of information. We assume that there is a social value of information, which we
model as a convex function of posterior expectation φ(∙). This formulation leaves aside benefits
from imprecision discussed in prior literature, such as inducing more efficient pre-disclosure ac-
tions (see, e.g., Kanodia 2006), since the benefits of imprecision in these settings are the object of
an extensive ongoing literature - in this respect, our study is meant to be incremental to other ratio-
nales for imprecision covered in this literature (whose main point is not about incentives to disclose
ex-post). This is also a manner to take a simple conceptual perspective in which the regulator’s
problem can be thought as either a welfare problem or, more simply, as increasing an information
flow to the market. We discuss in Section 4.2 an extension of our results in the context of the
collateral financing problem of Goex and Wagenhofer (2009).
3 Analysis
3.1 Effect of imprecision on disclosure
As a benchmark, we state the equilibriumwith perfect measurement. The equilibrium is standard
in the literature and such that informed managers disclose information if and only if they observe
a state x above a threshold t0. We further know that this threshold must satisfy the indifference
condition for the marginal discloser φ(μt0nd) = φ(t0), where μ
t0
nd ≡ μ(nd; F ) is the non-disclosure
expectation with a perfect measurement. Simplifying, the above equation is simply μt0nd = t0 so
that this indifference condition is not a function of φ(∙) and the disclosure threshold is given by
equation (7) in Jung and Kwon (1988). Note that, while the social value of information does
not affect the localization of the disclosure threshold under perfect measurement, non-disclosure
decreases firm value more when φ(∙) is highly convex.12 Put differently, there is no adjustment in
12In the equilibrium of the voluntary disclosure model, the firm value is (q + (1 − q)F (t0))φ(μt0nd) + (1 −
q)
∫ v
t0
φ(x)f(x)dx, versus qφ(E(V )) + (1 − q) ∫ φ(x)f(x)dx if the manager did not withhold strategically. The loss
of expected surplus due to strategic withholding is a function of φ(∙) (and is zero if φ(∙) is linear). However, as noted
17
the probability of disclosure because the manager only cares about the posterior expectation and
not the ex-ante surplus.
To obtain intuition for the benefit of imprecision, suppose that the marginal discloser does
not receive a perfectly precise signal, but instead observes that V ∈ [t, a2). In other words, the
expectation at the marginal discloser is E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). This marginal discloser has an incentive
to disclose as long as the posterior expectation is greater under disclosure than under withholding:
E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) ≥ μtnd, (2)
where the non-disclosure posterior μtnd ≡ μ(nd; G) is simply the expectation of V conditional on
either the manager being uninformed or the manager being informed and withholding when V < t.
Note a key difference with standard voluntary disclosure theory (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985;
Jung and Kwon 1988; Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer 2011; Guttman, Kremer and Skrzypacz
2014). The expectation in equation (2) implies that the marginal discloser receives E(V |V ∈
[t, a2)) instead of t under a perfect measurement. Consequently, the manager receives a higher
price when disclosing and a smaller withholding region can be sustained in equilibrium.
To illustrate this point further, consider a straightforward binary measurement: the firm knows
only whether the asset values is above or below a threshold t (i.e., set a2 = v). The equilibrium is
always such that measurements with v ∈ [0, t) are withheld and v ∈ [t, v) are disclosed, because
these are the lowest and higher payoff, respectively, that can be achieved by the manager. Hence,
the regulator can implement any disclosure threshold t, including thresholds below t0. But the
reduction in withholding carries an informational loss: the increase in information available over
low asset values v ≤ t translates into a decrease in the information for v > t. As the threshold
t → 0, the probability of strategic withholding converges to zero and nondisclosure becomes a
perfect signal about the uninformed firm. But, then, the information about all other asset values
becomes completely imprecise. Even if the convexity of the payoff function φ(∙) implies some
in text, the voluntary disclosure threshold t0 and the probability of disclosure (1− q)(1−F (t0)) are not a function of
φ(∙).
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benefits from information, determining which of these two competing effects dominates requires
further analysis.
We move next to the characterization of the optimal measurement. We make first a basic
observation that greatly simplifies the problem. Recall that measurements with v ≥ a2 imply
posterior expectations that are strictly greater than the non-disclosure price, so that incentives to
withhold are not a binding constraint. Hence, we can focus on implementing the measurement
system that maximizes ex-ante value ignoring strategic reporting for asset values above a2. From a
direct application of Jensen’s inequality, the preferred measurement is one that is fully-informative
for any v ≥ a2.
Lemma 1 LetM characterize an optimal measurement with I ≥ 3, then VFI = [a2, v).
Lemma 1 does not apply to the region of the minimal disclosed measurement, i.e., [t, a2) be-
cause, in this region, increasing precision further changes the posterior expectation of the marginal
disclosers E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) and alters the withholding region.
To engage the next step of the proof, observe that we would ideally want to reduce a2 as
much as possible if we were to ignore the voluntary disclosure problem. To see why, recall from
lemma 1 that any v above a2 is perfectly reported so the informational loss decreases when the
information [t, a2) becomes more precise. Naturally, decreasing a2 makes the marginal disclosers
more willing to withhold so that it can only be continued until the voluntary disclosure problem
binds the indifference condition of the marginal discloser μtnd = E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)).
Lemma 2 LetM characterize an optimal measurement with I ≥ 3, then μtnd = E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)).
Lemma 2 implies a simple graphical representation of the measurement design problem. We
plot in Figure 2 the non-disclosure market value φ(μtnd) for different thresholds t. We know from
Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer (2011) that the particular disclosure threshold t0 minimizes the
non-disclosure price. Now, consider implementing t < t0, which requires designing an imprecise
measurement [t, a2) that satisfies μtnd = E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)).
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Figure 2: Imprecision at the threshold
The required imprecision [t, a2) can be obtained graphically. Let us draw a horizontal line
intersecting at (t, φ(t)). This horizontal line intersects the non-disclosure price at another point:
if the disclosure threshold had been set at this point, the non-disclosure price would be equal to
the equilibrium non-disclosure price. It so happens that this point is the desired a2. To see why,
remark that μa2nd can be decomposed as a weighted average of μtnd and E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). Having
constructed a2 so that μtnd = μ
a2
nd, it must be that E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) = μtnd which is what defines
the optimal coarse region [t, a2). To summarize, sustaining a disclosure threshold t < t0 requires
an imprecise measurement [t, a2) delimited by the horizontal line.
When t is close to t0, this region converges to a point and no imprecision is required. When
t converges to zero, the solution converges to a2 = v and prescribes complete imprecision when
the firm is informed. In-between, the region of imprecision must include t0 so that shrinking
strategic withholding would always come with a loss of information over some asset values that
would have been disclosed under a fully precise measurement. In fact, while a lower threshold t
implies a higher non-disclosure price, we can also observe that the horizontal line at φ(μtnd) will
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intersect φ(t) somewhere in [t, a2): despite the potential gain from more information, some firms
must achieve a lower price in an equilibrium with imprecision relative to the equilibrium in which
t = t0.
While imprecision may hurt some firms and benefit others once the asset value realizes, can it
increase expected firm value? To answer this question, Figure 2 has another critical implication.
Regardless of how we set the disclosure threshold t, the posterior expectation implied by all asset
values less than a2 must be pinned down by the horizontal line. So, from the point of view of
posterior expectations, any measurement with imprecision is equivalent to a simpler measurement
in which we set the withholding threshold at a2.
Lemma 3 LetM characterize an optimal measurement, then VFI = [t, v).
The lemma relies on the property of marginal disclosers in voluntary disclosure equilibria.
The strategic withholding condition in (2) rules out any dispersion in posterior expectations near
the disclosure threshold. So, while the measurement can elicit more information over unfavorable
events, no useful information is given that would cause revisions in posterior expectations. Hence,
the optimal measurement takes the form of a withholding threshold above which the measure-
ment is fully-informative. This implies that no imprecision is effectively used to discipline more
voluntary disclosure than what would emerge in Jung and Kwon (1988).
Proposition 1 A fully precise measurement is optimal. In this measurement, the asset value is
reported if and only if the verifiable information exists and v is greater than the Jung and Kwon
(1988) threshold t0.
While frictions may prevent voluntary disclosures from unravelling to reveal all information, it
achieves the most useful amount of information for production purposes. Surprisingly, while the
measurement can interplay with voluntary disclosure and affect the provision of information about
good or bad news, it can never do so in a way that would increase the expected value of the firm.
Put differently, the cost of overcoming strategic withholding is always greater than its benefits on
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reducing withholding.
This may seem surprising given our earlier observations about withholding behavior around
the disclosure threshold. The result stands on a simple intuition which can be constructed starting
from the minimum principle in disclosure theory (Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer 2011; Guttman,
Kremer and Skrzypacz 2014; Dye and Hughes 2018). The minimum principle implies that the
full-information threshold minimizes the withholding price among all other possible thresholds;
so, it serves to discipline as much disclosure as would be possible if we could set the threshold at
another location. But intuitively, this is the task that the measurement sets out to do, by changing
the nature of the information received.
3.2 Private costs of disclosure
We extend the model to a second friction affecting disclosure choices, by assuming as in Ein-
horn and Ziv (2008) that disclosure may involve both uncertainty about information endowment
and private costs. Specifically, the firm internalizes a cost c > 0 when making a disclosure. We
assume that, plausibly, this cost mainly reflects distributional effects to other parties affected by
the disclosure (competitors, consumers, other firms, etc.) and is not viewed by the regulator as a
social cost.
We plot in Figure 3 the payoff to a withholding manager as a function of the lower bound t
in the imprecision interval, with and without disclosure costs. The solution to Jung and Kwon
(1988) with disclosure costs is now located at tc > t0. Note that imprecision creates dispersion in
posterior expectations (a pre-condition for the information to be useful in our model) because the
non-disclosure posterior expectation is strictly lower than the posterior expectation of the marginal
discloser E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). We should try to set t as small as possible but large enough so that
marginal disclosers do not deviate to withhold and are compensated for incurring a disclosure cost.
The optimal withholding threshold t∗ is located between t0 and tc, the disclosure in Jung and Kwon
(1988) without and with costs, respectively.
Our next result, Proposition 2 below, states that the optimal measurement system always in-
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Figure 3: Imprecision with disclosure costs
volves imprecision when disclosure is privately costly but not a social cost.
Proposition 2 If disclosure is costly (i.e., c > 0), the optimal measurement G∗ is such that there
exists a single non-empty imprecise region [t∗, a∗2) such that: (i) any state below t∗ is withheld, (ii)
states in [t∗, a∗2) are reported coarsely and (iii) any state above a∗2 are reported precisely.
Let us explain the intuition for this finding in several steps, starting from an intuitive, but
incomplete, argument why imprecision becomes optimal with private costs. It is true that private
costs cause a misalignment between the firm and the regulator, as the firm internalizes disclosure
costs while the regulator does not. However, the disclosure strategy, even absent costs, is not a
function of the social value of information φ(∙) and thus already exhibits misalignment between
the ex-ante problem solved by the regulator and the ex-post disclosure problem solved by the firm.
This translates into a voluntary disclosure equilibrium that yields less disclosure than would be
ex-ante desirable to the regulator and, yet, does not require imprecision in Proposition 1. In short,
misalignment of objectives is not a sufficient condition for imprecision to be optimal.
The effect of costs here is slightly different. The key to our earlier result is that the regulator
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cannot create dispersion in posterior beliefs between a non-disclosing firm and a marginal dis-
closer. With private costs, however, there is additional dispersion in posterior beliefs because the
marginal discloser must achieve a strictly greater expectation about the asset value V (gross of
cost). Exploiting this, imprecision increases the variation in posterior beliefs around the disclosure
threshold. Put differently, disclosure costs separate expectations about fundamentals between non-
disclosers and marginal disclosers: an imprecise measurement, by increasing the probability that a
firm is a marginal discloser, translates into more variation in posterior beliefs.13
We illustrate these results using an example that serves to reveal the expected loss suffered by
moving the withholding threshold below t0. We start with the model without costs. Let us set V
to be uniform on [0, 1] and a market value φ(x) = x2. If we set a fully-informative measurement
Mall, the manager will withhold information (after some cumbersome but otherwise uninteresting
algebra) when v ≤ t0 is given by t0 = μt0nd = 1 − 11+√q . Reinjecting this threshold yields an
expected value
σall ≡ E(φ(E(V |R)) = 1 + 2
√
q
3(1 +
√
q)2
, (3)
which, as expected, decreases as the friction q increases.14
Alternatively, consider measurements in which we elicit more precise disclosures for V below
13Another way to understand the result that imprecision is optimal with costly disclosure is as follows. As we
depart from perfect measurement and we decrease the threshold t below tc, two competing forces arise: a dispersion
effect and an information loss effect. The dispersion effect captures the fact that, as we decrease the threshold, we
increase the dispersion between the expectation at the marginal discloser, E(V |t < V < a2), and the nondisclosure
expectation, μtnd. Intuitively, the spread between the expectation at the marginal discloser and the nondisclosure price
is what compensates the marginal discloser for incurring the disclosure cost. When, by decreasing the threshold, we
make the market more skeptical towards nondisclosure, the marginal discloser has to be compensated more, as at
lower payoff levels the marginal benefit of a higher posterior expectation relative to the nondisclosure expectation is
smaller. Thus, the spread between these two expectations must increase. All else equal, the dispersion effect increases
the ex ante expected firm value, since firm value is convex in the posterior expectation. By contrast, the information
loss effect represents the fact that the information conveyed by the marginal discloser is now coarser, as the marginal
discloser is not a single point tc anymore, but rather an interval of values, [t, a2). Hence, all else equal the information
loss effect decreases the ex ante expected firm value. In a neighborhood of t = tc, the information loss effect is
negligible, because it negatively affects firm value only conditional on the asset being equal to the threshold tc, which
is a zero probability event. As a consequence, the positive dispersion effects dominates the negative information loss
effect, and some imprecision is optimal.
14To derive these expressions, note that the threshold equation from Jung and Kwon (1988) must satisfy
(1− q) t
2
0
2
− q(1
2
− t0),
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t0. Specifically, set VFI = [a2, v) and a coarse region [t, a2). We vary t and set the minimum a2
that satisfies (2). If t ≥ t0, we can simply set a2 = t.15 If t < t0, we need to set the expectation in
the disclosure region [t, a2) greater than the expectation when withholding, requiring16
a2 =
q(1− t)
q(1− t) + t > t0. (4)
As observed earlier, the lower the threshold t, the greater the threshold a2. Similarly, the greater
the disclosure friction q, the more the measurement must increase a2. In Figure 4, we plot the
resulting expected value for various levels of the friction q. As shown earlier, for each of these
plots, the expected surplus peaks at t0 and there is a loss of useful information for thresholds above
or below t0.
Assume next that firms bear a private disclosure cost c > 0. We plot in Figure 5 several ex-
amples following the uniform specification and quadratic payoff φ(∙) used in the previous section,
a probability of being uninformed q = 0.1 and various choices for c from 0 to 0.3. At c = 0, the
expected firm value is maximized at a = t0 which means that there is no value in imprecision. As
c increases, the total value no longer peaks at the disclosure threshold under a cost c denoted tc and
there is an interior imprecise interval. Note that the region of imprecision shifts to the right and
shrinks as c becomes small because then withholding becomes increasingly unlikely.
and we can then obtain σall from
σall = (q + (1− q)t0)(μtnd)2 + (1− q)(1− t0)E(V 2|V ≥ t0)
=
1 + 2
√
q
3(1 +
√
q)2
.
15This is an innocuous abuse of language since we would have here that VFI = [t, v) with no need to coarsen the
information above the threshold.
16This follows from
t + a2
2
=
q × 12 + (1− q)t× t2
q + (1− q)t .
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4 Extensions
4.1 Withholding Penalties
Although enforcement agencies may not know right away whether a manager chose to withhold
information, there may be situations where a regulator and/or court of law may act to enforce
against strategic withholding at a later date after the fact. For example, in the absence of an
impairment, it may come to light that the manager was informed because of an insider leak or some
later information emerges that reveals a fraud (e.g., shredded audit documents). These aspects echo
various formalizations of this problem where an outside party may reveal whether the manager was
informed; see Dye (2018) for a recent analysis.
Because our main focus here is on the choice of measurement, which on its own presents a
non-trivial optimal choice, we simplify this problem to capture the first-order effect of individual
legal risks in reduced-form. There is a cost borne by the firm management when strategically
withholding. We have in mind that the existence of material information is revealed at some date
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in the future, or randomly after the manager makes the reporting choice. More generally speaking,
the model speaks to a plausible setting in which a manager willingly withholding information
would not receive exactly the same payoff as a manager who was uninformed and did not withhold
intentionally.
We assume that the signal is about the existence of information and, for parsimony, does not
depend on the realized signal. This assumption is made primarily to focus our attention and is not
a critical part of our analysis. Formally, there is a withholding penalty θ > 0 borne by a manager
strategically withholding. Note that it could be that the occurrence of the penalty is random and,
under this interpretation, we should define θ as the expected penalty. For obvious practical reasons,
we assume that the ability to punish the manager is bounded (θ < v); for example, if the manager
may have consumed or transferred the misappropriated assets. We also assume that φ(E(V ))−θ >
φ(0) because otherwise there would be no gain from the lowest asset value to withhold.
We need to make assumptions about the problem solved by the measurement. Keeping with
the definition used for the baseline model, we examine measurements that maximize the expected
price E(φ(E(V |R))), setting aside the personal loss borne by the manager. It is plausible that a
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regulator such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would care more about pro-
ductive efficiency than about minimizing the discomfort of managers caught misreporting or we
may assume that they focus on investors. But the reason for this criterion is conceptual; we have
seen earlier that a fully-informative measurement would be optimal without penalties. If we were
to maximize the expected firm value net of expected penalties for strategic withholding, then it
would follow by construction than some imprecision is optimal to reduce the probability of bear-
ing penalties. This channel, while it is true and reinforce our current analysis, could be construed
as a second-order effect on the objective of the regulator. So in summary, we solve for the optimal
imprecision on expected firm value to investors.17
We begin by observing that withholding penalties need not imply more imprecision because
they reduce strategic withholding even in a fully-informative measurements; in fact, as θ becomes
large, strategic withholding converges to zero and there remains no scope for imprecision.18
Lemma 4 With a fully-precise measurementMall, there exists a unique solution tθ given by the
implicit solution to
φ(μtnd)− θ = φ(tθ). (5)
We consider next the design of a measurement which may be different from Mall. The next
Lemma is entirely along the lines of Lemmas 1 and 2 so we give it without proof.
17Another possible assumption would be to assume that the penalty is a deadweight loss taken from firm value, and
thus, would reduce the baseline non-disclosure price μtnd by the expected penalty. This alternate assumption implies
forces very similar to the problem of maximizing manager surplus, except that the penalty is now borne even when
information is not received (since the market does not observe strategic withholding). In this setting, it is easily shown
that some imprecision is always desirable near the disclosure threshold in order to reduce the probability of the penalty.
18While entirely intuitive, it is worth noting that there is a difference with the recent result Dye (2018) which
develops the opposite intuition that verification over the withholding region would increase withholding. The reason
for this difference is that in this earlier study, a key force is that the penalty is paid back by the manager to shareholders,
and thus serves as manager-created insurance to investors buying shares in withholding firms. This is an interesting
force but in most cases the amount of funds paid directly from managers’ pockets is small relative to investor losses,
and a large part is of the penalty is in the form of losses that are partly deadweight to the parties involves, such
as reputations, fines, time spent in defense, lawyer fees or legal penalties. To this point, Laux and Stocken (2012)
provide a discussion of how having a deadweight component is essential to providing the right ex-ante incentives.
That said, an important joint insight within these papers and our research is that, for the additional forces here to hold,
it should be the case that the penalty is not redistributed to shareholders in a way that would affect price in a way that
is quantitatively non-trivial.
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Figure 6: Imprecision with withholding penalties
Lemma 5 Suppose thatM is optimal, then eitherM = Mall or VFI = (a2, v). Furthermore,
φ(μtnd)− θ = φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))). (6)
We next extend Figure 2 to develop more graphical intuition as to how the withholding penalty
affects the choice of measurement. We first plot in Figure 6 the payoff to a withholding manager as
a function of the threshold t, with and without withholding costs. The solution to Jung and Kwon
(1988) with withholding costs is now located at tθ < t0. We then apply the previous logic to
implement a withholding threshold t < tθ, with a region of imprecision [t, a2).19
Note that, just like for the case of disclosure costs, imprecision creates dispersion in posterior
expectations (a pre-condition for the information to be useful in our model) because the non-
19This is now slightly different from the baseline and the complete solution can no longer be obtained graphically
(although the intuition can). As in the baseline, we should try to set a2 as small possible but large enough so that
marginal disclosers do not deviate to withhold, that is, φ(μtnd)−θ = φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). Using the same construction
as in Figure 2, we can recover a threshold t′ > t that yields the same posterior μtnd and implies (from the same
arguments as in Figure 2) that E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) = μtnd. But setting a2 = t′ makes the imprecision excessive since it
would imply that φ(μtnd)− θ < φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). So, as shown in the Figure, the optimal a2 can be visualized by
drawing a line sloping down.
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disclosure posterior expectation μtnd is strictly greater than the posterior expectation E(V |V ∈
[t, a2)). From this, it follows that there would be a strict informational loss when moving t to a2
into a single withholding region. Indeed, building on this intuition, we derive the following result.
Proposition 3 With non-zero withholding penalties θ > 0, the optimal measurement exhibits an
imprecise region for the marginal discloser [t∗, a∗2) with t∗ < tθ < a∗2.
We can rephrase the intuition for the greater variation in posterior expectations in economic
terms. The withholding penalty is now used as a complement to imprecision to discipline firms
with asset values higher than t∗ to disclose. Under full-information, the penalty would only bind
for the marginal discloser which, at x = tθ, is an event with probability zero. A larger region of
imprecision [t∗, a∗2) implies that the penalty binds for a larger set of asset values.
We discuss below a few additional key implications of the proposition. First, we show that,
contrary to standard voluntary disclosure theory, the information becomes endogenously coarse
over the lowest reported events. So, we expect in this theory for the firm to be vaguer about
bad news that is voluntarily reported. On this point, Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra and Venugopalan
(2009) interpret measurement systems that are more precise over favorable information as more
conservative. Second, the posterior expectation is not increasing in asset values. In the model,
informed managers with sufficiently bad news choose to bear the individual penalty and with-
hold, but in exchange receive a higher price: formally, the voluntary disclosure problem requires
φ(μt
∗
nd) − θ = φ(E(V |V ∈ [t∗, a∗2)) in the manager’s problem which, in turn, implies from an
investor’s perspective that φ(μt∗nd) > φ(E(V |V ∈ [t∗, a∗2)). A firm choosing to reveal a low asset
value would trigger a current market response that is more negative than if it had stayed silent.
We plot in Figure 7 several examples following the uniform specification and quadratic payoff
φ(∙) used in the previous section, a probability of being uninformed q = 0.1 and various choices
for θ from 0 to 0.07. At θ = 0, the expected firm value is maximized at a2 = t0 which means that
there is no value in imprecision. As θ increases, the total value no longer peaks at t0 and there is
an interior imprecise interval on [a∗2, tθ) where a∗2 is the choice that attains the peak of the curve.
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Figure 7: Firm value as a function of imprecision (q = .1)
Note that the region of imprecision shifts to the left and shrinks as θ becomes large because then
withholding becomes increasingly unlikely. In fact, for values of θ greater than .25, there is no
longer any strategic withholding on the equilibrium path and the only firms that do not disclose are
those that did not receive information.
4.2 Collateral Financing and Non-convexities
For our baseline analyses, we assumed so far that the firm would, a-priori, prefer to implement
measurements with more information after the disclosure choice. Here, we revisit an application
of the theory to the financing problem described in Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) and Bertomeu
and Cheynel (2015), in which the firm uses the measured asset as collateral to raise external funds.
Goex and Wagenhofer show that, absent voluntary disclosure, the measurement would prescribe
imprecision over favorable events to maximize the likelihood of meeting a collateral constraint.20
We extend this problem along the two dimensions specific to our study: first incorporating vol-
untary disclosure with a friction to receiving information, and second, considering the potential
20We also derived (on request) a theoretical solution for an abstract class of S-shaped payoff function φ′′′ < 0 which
imply a very similar measurement system as in this section.
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value of information after the firm receives financing affected by both measurement and voluntary
disclosures.21
As in Goex and Wagenhofer (2009), the firm must finance an investment to operate but in order
to do so, pledges a minimum value of assets as collateral in the form of a constraint E(V |r) ≥ vˆ,
where vˆ is a collateral requirement; see Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) or Goex and Wagenhofer
(2009) for various micro-foundations in terms of a principal-agent problem.22 If the firm does
not operate, it obtains a payoff normalized to zero, implying a payoff φ(x) = 1x≥vˆψ(x) where
ψ(x) ≥ ψ(0) = 0 is a convex payoff once the investment is made.
Note that, if vˆ > 0, the payoff is neither convex nor concave and, as vˆ → 0, the model reduces
to the baseline problem. For later use in this section, it is convenient to denote t0 as the voluntary
disclosure threshold defined earlier absent any collateral constraint, that is with φ(x) = ψ(x).
We shall derive a solution by decomposing the design problem in terms of two possible choices
of measurement. The first family of measurements is one in which some firms do not meet their
collateral constraint. This can only occur if disclosure is a pre-condition to receiving financing,
that is, μtnd < vˆ, since otherwise no informed firm would willingly disclose information that
would cause its value to fall below the collateral requirement. In the next lemma, we solve for the
preferred measurement in this family.
Lemma 6 Let M1 be an optimal measurement in which some firms do not meet their collateral
constraint. Then it takes the form of a withholding threshold t and a collateral threshold a2 > t,
such that:
(i) asset values below t are withheld with μtnd < vˆ;
21This formulation is a slightly modified version of Goex andWagenhofer (2009) - part of this is to nest our baseline
model with convex payoffs in this analysis but there is also a fundamental reason as to why additional generality is
important here. In their original model, Goex and Wagenhofer assume a fixed project payoff ψ(x) = π0 when it is
financed so that the optimal decision that is implemented by the measurement is binary. The binary decision makes the
voluntary disclosure problem moot because financed firms would always disclose voluntarily. Bertomeu and Cheynel
(2015) develop this model when the proceeds from selling the collateral can be reinvested, so that φ(∙) is linear in parts
and do not model the interaction between measurement and voluntary disclosure.
22These studies show that vˆ can be recovered as a function, for example, of the cost of effort of the agent and the
properties of cash flows and accounting reports.
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(ii) asset values are reported in the form of an imprecise measurement [t, a2) that exactly meets
the collateral constraint E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) = vˆ; and
(iii) asset values v ≥ a2 are perfectly measured and disclosed.
A point of note is that the optimal choice of [t, a2) is a function of the benefit of meeting the
collateral constraint ψ(vˆ) and the convexity of the function ψ(∙). To be specific, the choice of the
imprecise region [t, a2) maximizes the expected value of the firm
σ = (1− q)(F (a2)− F (t))ψ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))) (7)
+(1− q)
∫ v
a2
f(x)ψ(x)dx,
subject to the collateral constraint E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) = vˆ.
If ψ(∙) is approximately linear to the right vˆ, we return to the type of measurements in the
spirit of Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) in which a2 = v is the preferred measurement to use when
not all firms can meet their collateral constraints. At the other extreme, if vˆ is small, we return to
the convex problem in proposition 1, and the optimal measurement features a2 nearly equal to t.
Even in this case, however, the optimal choice a2 is never exactly equal to t, which rules out fully
informative measurements of the form derived earlier.
We next consider a second family of measurements in which all firms meet their collateral
constraints within the chosen measurement. Note that, for this to occur, withholding firms must
achieve a posterior expectation μtnd ≥ vˆ. We know that μtnd ∈ (μt0nd,E(V )], so this equation can be
met for some t if and only if the unconditional expected value of the asset E(V ) is greater than vˆ.
We solve for the optimal measurement within this family in the next lemma.
Lemma 7 LetM2 be an optimal measurement in which all firms are financed:
(i) if vˆ ≤ t0, the full-information measurementMFI is optimal;
(ii) if vˆ ∈ (μt0nd,E(V )], there exists t > t0 given by μtnd = vˆ such thatM2 has two regions: all
asset values below t are withheld, and all asset values above t are disclosed;
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(iii) If vˆ ≥ E(V ), there is no measurement in which all firms are financed.
The setting in (i) is a special case of the model where the unconditional value of the collateral is
sufficiently large so that strategic withholding would on its own imply a non-disclosure posterior
expectation that would meet the collateral constraint. Note that the higher the probability that
the measurement does not yield information, the greater the non-disclosure price and therefore
the lower the collateral constraint can be. When this case occurs, the imprecision created by
the voluntary disclosure problem entirely subsumes any additional amount of imprecision in the
measurement. Hence, the firm can simply use a full-information measurement and let the manager
strategically withhold information on an ex-post basis.
Part (ii) extends this argument to the richer setting in which a full-information measurement
would have caused non-disclosing firms to shut down. To address the financing problem, the mea-
surement pools uninformed firms and informed firms with v < t until the collateral requirement
μtnd = vˆ is met. This requires, in turn, to set t > t0 and raises imprecision above the level that
would have been implemented absent collateral requirements.
Extending the comparative static in (i), an increase in the probability to receive information will
reduce μtnd as investors become skeptical. To compensate for this decrease, the reporting threshold
t must increase. Put differently, precision in the measurement and in voluntary disclosure act
as substitutes, with greater imprecision being implemented in response to a lower friction in the
voluntary disclosure channel. Finally, in part (iii), if the unexpected value of the collateral E(V )
falls below vˆ, not all firms can be financed and a measurement in this family cannot be used.
When is it desirable to use each of the two types measurement? The next proposition develops a
direct comparison of the two families of measurements as a function of the severity of the collateral
problem and the probability of information endowment.
Proposition 4 The optimal measurement is as follows:
(i) If vˆ < μt0nd, a fully-informative measurementMall is an optimal measurement.
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(ii) Otherwise, there exists q0 ∈ [0, 1] such that if q < q0, the optimal measurement has the form
M1 in which non-disclosing firm cannot be financed and, if q ≥ q0, the optimal measurement
has the formM2 in which all firms are financed.
A few comments are helpful to interpret the proposition in practical terms. If the collateral
constraint is sufficiently severe, the optimal measurement must focus on increasing the collateral
above the minimum required collateral vˆ. In turn, this requires taking away financing from certain
firms with v < vˆ. But the voluntary disclosure problem implies that such firms could have claimed
to be uninformed, so that this type of solution to the financing problem involves denying financing
to all uninformed firms, which can be particularly costly when assets are hard to measure and it is
likely that the firm does not receive information.
If the collateral constraint is moderate or mild, it is possible to finance all firms by creating
enough imprecision in the measurement but doing so comes with a trade-off because it removes
useful information when firms are financed. There are, therefore, two possible options to design
the measurement. One is to finance all firms and tolerate a relatively coarse measurements that
includes uninformed firms and firms with v ≤ vˆ. The other is to use a measurement in which
non-disclosure firms do not receive financing but, conditional on being financed, firms report a
precise measurement.
The main consideration required to select between the two types of measurements is the prob-
ability of receiving information. To explain this, note first that for all firms to be financed inM2, it
must be that E(v) ≥ vˆ so that there is enough asset value in expectation. In turn, this implies that,
in any setting in which we may electM2, it will be the case that firms that do not receive verifiable
information, whose expected asset value is E(V ) contribute to meeting the collateral constraint.
The higher q, the higher the proportion of such firms in forming the non-disclosure expectation
μtnd and thus the easier it will be to meet the collateral constraint inM2. By contrast, the higher q,
the greater the fraction of non-disclosing firms that cannot invest in a measurementM1. So, con-
sidering both forces, environments with less information are conducive to measurements which
favor coarse measurements for low asset values and more financing.
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5 Conclusion
By and large, prior literature emphasizes either accounting measurements as ex-ante choices or
the problem of strategic reporting over an otherwise external arrival of information. Yet, both
problems are closely tied to each other, with the ex-ante design affecting incentives to withhold
information. What can we say of the nature of measurements and voluntary disclosures when both
are endogenously determined?
In our baseline model, there is uncertainty about whether objective information exists about a
particular outcome and the firm designs a measurement system that may publicly provide infor-
mation when objective information exists. As a broad example, an event may or may not have
occurred or may be measurable, and the firm may design a measurement system that collects in-
formation about the event provided measurable information exists. In this environment, we find
that the firm should perfectly measure its assets. There is a loss of information due to strategic
withholding at the disclosure stage and suitably-designed measurements could certainly reduce the
probability of withholding. But the price to pay to do so is too large in that the required imprecision
required would destroy any possible use of this information.
We have shown this insight within a fairly generic version of the Dye (1985) and Jung and
Kwon (1988) and an intuitive class of decision problems in which, after the report is observed,
management makes the decision that maximizes post-report market prices. Yet we view it as a
first benchmark to uncovering elements that would lead to imprecision becoming valuable in this
setting. We study two empirically plausible extensions of the baseline model. First, as a function
of private penalties imposed on management, some imprecision around the voluntary disclosure
threshold always increases firm value. Second, if the firm bears collateral constraints, there is value
in imprecision as a function of disclosure frictions. We can take these results as broad implications
as to the nature of designing accounting rules, with attention to the voluntary nature of the process
through which information flows to the market.
Applied questions may provide paths for continuing the research agenda discussed in this study,
with the focus on non-convexities due to collateral measurements being one of many potential av-
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enues. How do measurements and voluntary disclosures interact when the firm wishes to persuade
an auditor to issue a favorable opinion? How does the firm select measurements to control infor-
mation flows to the product market? We hope that these classic questions can be revisited from the
perspective of a theory in which measurement and voluntary disclosures endogenously coexist.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. LetM be a measurement system. Recall that we restrict the attention to VFI being
an interval and, without loss of generality, set the withholding region [a0, t] not to overlap with VFI . We
already know that asset values in [a0, t] are withheld, so that VFI must be either empty, must be the interval
[t, a2) or must be some interval [ai, ai+1) with i ≥ 2.
Suppose by contradiction that M does not have the form prescribed in Lemma 1. We construct an
alternative measurement systemM′ = (V ′FI , (a′i)Ii=0), with associated report R′ . Let us setM′ to coincide
withM except for V ′FI = VFI ∪ [a2, v), which implies (i) the requirement of (2) remains satisfied byM′
and R′ is more precise in the sense of Blackwell than r. By Jensen’s inequality, this implies that
E(φ(E(V |R))) < E(φ(E(V |R′))),
and violates the optimality ofM. It follows that anyM with I ≥ 3 must be such that VFI = [a2, v).
Proof of Lemma 2. LetM be an optimal measurement. We know that if the claim does not hold, we
know from lemma 1 that [t, a2) 6= VFI is a coarse interval and, from (2), is such that μtnd ≤ E(V |V ∈
[t, a2)).
Suppose by contradiction that μtnd > E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). By continuity, there exists y < a2 such that
μtnd > E(V |V ∈ [t, y]). Consider a measurement M′ which coincides with M except that the element
of the partition [t, a2) is replaced by two elements [t, y) and [y, a2). Note that the withholding region is
unchanged, implying that μtnd remains unchanged and, by construction of y, (2) is satisfied. However,
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M′ implies more precise information in the sense of Blackwell and, therefore, from Jensen’s inequality,
E(φ(E(V |R′))) > E(φ(E(V |R))), contradicting the optimality ofM.
Proof of Lemma 3. LetM be an optimal measurement. By contradiction, if the claim does not hold,
we know from lemma 1 that [t, a2) 6= VFI is a coarse interval and, from (2), is such that μtnd ≤ E(V |V ∈
[t, a2)).
Suppose by contradiction that μtnd > E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). By continuity, there exists y < a2 such that
μtnd > E(V |V ∈ [t, y]). Consider a measurement M′ which coincides with M except that the element
of the partition [t, a2) is replaced by two elements [t, y) and [y, a2). Note that the withholding region is
unchanged, implying that μtnd remains unchanged and, by construction of y, (2) is satisfied. However,
M′ implies more precise information in the sense of Blackwell and, therefore, from Jensen’s inequality,
E(φ(E(V |R′))) > E(φ(E(V |R))), contradicting the optimality ofM.
It thus follows from the previous paragraph that μtnd = E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). But, then, we can create a
measurementM′ by setting t′ = a′1 = a2, leaving all the other elements of the partition inM unchanged.
We then know that
μt
′
nd =
qE(V ) + (1− q)F (a2)E(V |V ≤ a2)
q + (1− q)F (a2)
=
q + (1− q)F (t)
q + (1− q)F (a2) ×
qE(V ) + (1− q)F (t)E(V |V ≤ t)
q + (1− q)F (t)
+
(1− q)(F (a2)− F (t))
q + (1− q)F (a2) × E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))
=
q + (1− q)F (t)
q + (1− q)F (a2)μ
t
nd +
(1− q)(F (a2)− F (t))
q + (1− q)F (a2) μ
t
nd = μ
t
nd.
To satisfy (2) inM′, we are left to compare μtnd and a2; however, since μtnd = E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)), we know
that a2 ≥ μtnd. To conclude the proof, note that, by construction, E(V |R) and E(V |R′) are always equal,
hence,M′ yields the same payoffs asM.
Proof of Proposition 1. We have shown in lemma 3 that we can restrict the analysis to measurements
where VFI = [t, v). From (2), it must hold that
μtnd =
qE(V ) + (1− q)F (t)E(V |V ≤ t)
q + (1− q)F (t) ≤ t.
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Integrating by parts as in Jung and Kwon (1988) and rearranging terms, this inequality is rewritten as
ψ(t) = (1− p)
∫ t
0
F (v)dv − p(E(V )− t) ≥ 0. (A.1)
Recall from earlier that this takes the form of an inequality because while a firm with v ≥ t could withhold,
the firm with v < t receives a message [0, t) from the measurement and would never do better than withhold.
Differentiating this expression,
ψ′(t) = (1− p)F (t) + p > 0,
and we also know from Jung and Kwon (1988) that ψ(t0) = 0. So, (A.1) is satisfied if and only if t ≥ t0.
Having shown this, comparing a threshold t > t0 to t0, we know that the latter is more precise in the
sense of Blackwell, hence, it yields higher expected surplus. To conclude the argument, note that a fully
informative measurement Mall implies that equation (2) must be satisfied at equality and implements t0.
This concludes the proof and establishes thatMall, that is, full-information is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. For a given threshold t, the upper bound of the imprecise interval, a2, satisfies
the indifference condition for the marginal discloser, that is,
Γ(t, a2) ≡ φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))− c− φ(μtnd) = 0. (A.2)
The expected firm value, denoted Σ, is given by
Σ = (q + (1− q)F (t))φ(μtnd) + (1− q)(F (a2)− F (t))φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))
+(1− q)
∫ v
a2
φ(v)f(v)dv. (A.3)
Taking the derivative of the expected firm value in (A.3) with respect to t yields
∂Σ
∂t
= (1− q)f(t)φ(μtnd) + (q + (1− q)F (t))
∂μtnd
∂t
φ′(μtnd)
+(1− q)(F (a2)− F (t))φ′
(
E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))
)
∂E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))
∂t
+(1− q)
(
∂a2
∂t
f(a2)− f(t)
)
φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))− (1− q)∂a2
∂t
φ(a2)f(a2). (A.4)
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We obtain separately the following derivatives in (A.4),
∂E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))
∂t
=
(
∂a2
∂t
a2f(a2)− tf(t)
)
/(F (a2)− F (t))
−
(
∂a2
∂t
f(a2)− f(t)
)∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx/
(
F (a2)− F (t)
)2
=
(
∂a2
∂t
f(a2)(a2 − E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))
)
/(F (a2)− F (t))
−f(t)(t− E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))/(F (a2)− F (t)),
∂μtnd
∂t
=
(1− q)f(t)(t− μtnd)
q + (1− q)F (t) .
Reinjecting the expressions above into (A.4) yields
∂Σ
∂t
= (1− q)f(t)
(
φ′(μtnd)(t− μtnd)− (φ(t)− φ(μtnd))
)
+(1− q)f(a2)∂a2
∂t
(
φ′(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))(a2 − E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))−
(
φ(a2)− φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))
))
+(1− q)f(t)
(
φ′(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))− t)− (φ(E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)))− φ(t))
)
, (A.5)
where we have subtracted (1− q)f(t)φ(t) in the first term and added it back in the third.
Using the implicit function theorem on Γ(t, a2) = 0 from (A.2), we find that the expression for ∂a2∂t is
∂a2
∂t
= −∂Γ(t, a2)
∂t
/
∂Γ(t, a2)
∂a2
=
φ′(μtnd)
φ′(E(V |V ∈[t,a2)))
∂μtnd
∂t [F (a2)− F (t)]− f(t)[E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))− t]
f(a2)[a2 − E(V |V ∈ [t, a2))] .
(A.6)
We first show that (A.5) evaluated at t = tc is negative. As t → tc, the imprecise interval shrinks, that
is, a2 → t because the lower and upper bounds of the imprecise interval both converge to tc. Therefore, in
this limit the third term of (A.5) converges to zero. Also the second term converges to zero, since ∂a2∂t |t=tc
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is finite.23 Only the first term is nonzero in the limit, hence
∂Σ
∂t
|t=tc = (1− q)f(tc)
(
φ′(μtcnd)(tc − μtcnd)− (φ(tc)− φ(μtcnd))
)
.
The indifference condition under perfect measurement, φ(tc) − c = φ(μtcnd), implies that tc > μtcnd, so by
convexity of φ(∙) we have φ(tc) > φ(μtcnd) + φ′(μtcnd)(tc − μtcnd). We conclude that
∂Σ
∂t
|t=tc < 0.
As a result, setting t = tc is not optimal and reducing t < tc will increase the expected firm value.
After we have shown that precise measurement is suboptimal, there remains to argue that an optimal
measurement exists. Setting t > tc is suboptimal, as it both increases strategic withholding and reduces
the set of perfectly measured asset values that are disclosed. Inspection of (A.5) shows that ∂Σ∂t > 0 for all
t ≤ t0, so setting t ≤ t0 is also suboptimal. Taken together, these considerations imply that there exists a
maximizer t∗ in the interval (t0, tc).
Proof of Lemma 4. The non-disclosure price μtnd remains given by equation (2) and, after applying the
integration by parts from Jung and Kwon (1988), can be written as
μtnd =
q(E(V )− tF (t)) + tF (t)− ∫ t0 F (v)dv
q + (1− q)F (t) .
23The expression for ∂a2∂t |t=tc can be derived as follows. First, note that
F (a2)− F (t)
f(a2)[a2 − E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2)] =
[F (a2)− F (t)]2
f(a2)
{
a2[F (a2)− F (t)]−
∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx
}
and
f(t)[E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2)− t]
f(a2)[a2 − E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2)] =
f(t)
{∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx− t[F (a2)− F (t)]
}
f(a2)
{
a2[F (a2)− F (t)]−
∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx
} .
Second, by L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
a2→t
[F (a2)− F (t)]2
f(a2)
{
a2[F (a2)− F (t)]−
∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx
} = lim
a2→t
1
f(a2)
lim
a2→t
2[F (a2)− F (t)]f(a2)
F (a2)− F (t) = 2
and
lim
a2→t
f(t)
{∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx− t[F (a2)− F (t)]
}
f(a2)
{
a2[F (a2)− F (t)]−
∫ a2
t
xf(x)dx
} = lim
a2→t
f(t)
f(a2)
lim
a2→t
f(a2)(a2 − t)
F (a2)− F (t) = lima2→t f(a2) lima2→t
a2 − t
F (a2)− F (t) = 1.
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The equilibrium must then be a solution to the indifference condition
φ(μtnd)− θ = φ(t),
where the left-hand side is the payoff from withholding net of penalty and the right-hand side is the payoff
to the marginal discloser. We show next the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
To show existence, evaluate first at t = t0 which implies that μtnd = t0 and, therefore, φ(μtnd)−θ < φ(t)
when t = t0. Evaluate next at t = 0, in which case μtnd = E(V ), which implies (by assumption) that
φ(t)− θ > φ(t) when t = 0. So, at least one solution exists with tθ ∈ (0, t0).
To show uniqueness, we first need to demonstrate that μtnd is concave in t, with minimum at t0. This is
a small elaboration on the claim in Proposition 1 of Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer (2011) who show only
the second part of this claim. To show this, rewrite (2) after applying the standard integration by parts, to
obtain
μtnd =
q(E(V )− tF (t)) + tF (t)− ∫ t0 F (v)dv
q + (1− q)F (t) ,
and differentiate in t,
∂μtnd
∂t
=
(1− q)f(t)[(1− q) ∫ t0 F (v)dv − q(E(V )− t)]
(q + (1− q)F (t))2 .
The term in brackets defines the threshold t0 when set to zero and changes sign as t crosses t0. In turn, this
implies that μtnd is U-shaped in t, as claimed.
We conclude that φ(μtnd) decreases for t on [0, t0], implying at most one solution for tθ on the interval
(0, t0). We also know that μtnd > t for t ∈ (t0, v) from the uniqueness of a solution to the standard Jung
and Kwon (1988) model. Hence, the solution is unique and must be located somewhere in (0, t0).
Proof of Proposition 3. The claim follows from the proof of Proposition 2 by symmetric arguments.
Proof of Lemma 6. We first show by contradiction that there must be an imprecise region [t, a2) such
that E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) ≥ vˆ. There are two cases to dismiss.
Case 1. There is an imprecise region [t, a2) but it is such that E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) < vˆ so that firms in this
region do not meet the collateral constraint. But, then, we can define a payoff equivalent measurement with
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a voluntary disclosure threshold set at t = a2. We can repeat this argument if [a2, a3) has the same property.
Case 2. Note that t > vˆ cannot be optimal since it yields lower expected firm value than setting t = vˆ (all
firms achieve the same payoff, except those with x ∈ [vˆ, t) which now meet the collateral constraint). We
are left to improve over a measurement such that t = vˆ and VFI = [vˆ, v).24
We take the derivative on the objective function (7) with respect to t. It yields
(1− q)
(
f(a2)
∂a2
∂t
− f(t)
)
ψ(vˆ)− (1− q)f(a2)ψ(a2)∂a2
∂t
. (A.7)
As t ↑ vˆ, a2 ↓ vˆ, the derivative simplifies to:
− (1− q)f(vˆ)ψ(vˆ) < 0 (A.8)
which confirms that for t set sufficiently close to vˆ, the imprecise region [t, a2) will increase the expected
value of the firm.
We then know from Case 1 and 2 that there exists an imprecise region [t, a2); further, because E(V |V ∈
[t, a2)) > vˆ, it must be that a2 > vˆ and therefore φ(∙) is convex for any v ≥ a2. A direct application of
Jensen’s inequality implies that setting VFI = [a2, v) is preferred to any other choice in the measurement.
We are left to show that E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)) = vˆ. Suppose not, and for expositional purposes, let us
denote M = E(V |V ∈ [t, a2)). Differentiating the total surplus Σ in (7) with respect to a2,
∂Σ
a2
= f(a2)[Ψ(M)−Ψ(a2) + (a2 −M)Ψ′(M)].
We know from the convexity of φ(∙) on y ≥ M that
Ψ′(M) <
Ψ(a2)−Ψ(M)
a2 −M .
which implies that this derivative is negative and the expected value would be increased by decreasing a2, a
contradiction.
24To be rigorous, we do not claim that this measurement would be feasible (it could be that μtnd > vˆ) but, ignoring
this constraint, it is an upper bound on any measurement with the form given in case 2. Hence, by showing that some
imprecision does better than this measurement, we know that case 2 cannot be optimal either.
43
Proof of Lemma 7. For part (i), we can solve a relaxed problem with φ(x) = ψ(x), ignoring the
collateral constraint. This relaxed problem yields an upper bound on the expected firm value achievable in
the problem with vˆ > 0. We know from Proposition 1 that the solution to this problem is the full-information
Mall and implies a posterior expectation conditional on withholding given by t0. Hence, this measurement
would meet the collateral constraint conditional on withholding in the original problem.
To show part (ii), note that we need μtnd ≥ vˆ. We have shown in the proof of lemma 4 that μtnd is
U-shaped with minimum at t0 and equals E(V ) at t = 0 or, in the limit when t → v. Hence, the condition
can be rewritten as either t ≤ b0 or t ≥ b1, where b0 ≤ t0 ≤ b1. We also know from the proof of lemma
3 that two measurements with threshold t, t′ such that t < t0 < t′ and μtnd = μt
′
nd yield the same expected
firm value, so we can, without loss of generality, restrict the analysis to t ≥ b1. An optimal measurement
should then prescribe full-information for any asset values v ≥ t. If t > b1, that is μtnd > vˆ is not binding,
reducing t would be feasible and increase the full-information region. In turn, from the convexity of φ(∙)
and applying Jensen’s inequality, this will increase expected firm value. It follows that μtnd = vˆ is binding.
The proof for part (iii) follows from the law of iterated expectation: for all firms to be financed, it must
hold that E(V |R) ≥ vˆ for any equilibrium report R, which implies E(E(V |R)) = E(V ) ≥ vˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of (i) follows directly from the proof of Lemma 7 (i) given thatMall
solves the relaxed problem in which the collateral constraint is ignored.
For (ii), we know from Lemma 7 (iii) that only a measurement of the formM1 is feasible when vˆ >
E(V ), so let us focus on the case vˆ ≤ E(V ). We denote Σ1 as the expected firm value with a measurement
of the formM1 with disclosure threshold t1, and Σ2 as the expected firm value with a measurement of the
formM2 with disclosure threshold t2. Letting Δ = Σ1 − Σ2.
Rewriting:
Δ = (1− q)
(
F (a2)− F (t1)
)
ψ(vˆ) + (1− q)
∫ v
a2
ψ(v)f(v)dv
−(q + (1− q)F (t2))ψ(vˆ)− (1− q)
∫ v
t2
ψ(v)f(v)dv.
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Differentiating with respect to q,
∂Δ
∂q
= −
(
F (a2)− F (t1)
)
ψ(vˆ)−
∫ v
a2
ψ(v)f(v)dv −
(
1− F (t2)
)
ψ(vˆ)
+
∫ v
t2
ψ(v)f(v)dv + (1− q)∂t2
∂q
ψ(t2)f(t2). (A.9)
Applying the implicit function theorem,
∂t2
∂q
= − ∂H(t2)/∂q
∂H(t2)/∂t2
, (A.10)
where H(t2) = μt2nd − vˆ. Further,
∂H(t2)
∂q
=
F (t2)E(V )−
∫ t2
0 vf(v)dv(
q + (1− q)F (t2)
)2 > 0
and
∂H(t2)
∂t2
=
(1− q)f(t2)(t2 − μt2nd)
q + (1− q)F (t2) > 0.
Hence, ∂t2∂q < 0. Moreover, when Δ = 0,
∫ v
a2
ψ(v)f(v)dv =
1
1− q (q + (1− q)F (t2))ψ(vˆ)
+
∫ v
t2
ψ(v)f(v)dv −
(
F (a2)− F (t1)
)
ψ(vˆ).
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Substituting the above expression in (A.9) yields:
−
(
F (a2)− F (t1)
)
ψ(vˆ)− 1
1− q (q + (1− q)F (t2))ψ(vˆ)
−
∫ v
t2
ψ(v)f(v)dv +
(
F (a2)− F (t1)
)
ψ(vˆ)
−
(
1− F (t2)
)
ψ(vˆ) +
∫ v
t2
ψ(x)f(x)dx + (1− q)∂t2
∂q
ψ(t2)f(t2)
= − 1
1− q (q + (1− q)F (t2))ψ(vˆ)−
(
1− F (t2)
)
ψ(vˆ) + (1− q)∂t2
∂q
ψ(t2)f(t2) < 0.
It then follows that increasing q makesM2 more desirable relative toM1.
B Optimality of partitional measurements
B.1 Formal definition of the optimization problem
In this Appendix, we show how an optimal measurement in the models of Verrecchia (1983), Dye
(1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) simplify to a convex-partitional measurement with coarseness only at
the marginal discloser. The proof involves many steps. For this reason, we first highlight the proof method.
Technically speaking, the problem under consideration is one of Bayesian persuasion, but with a con-
straint determined by the voluntary disclosure decision occurring after the design of the measurement sys-
tem. Absent the issue of incentive compatibility for the firm’s disclosure, the regulator problem boils down
to the choice of a distribution of posterior means G such that the distribution of the asset value, F , is a
mean-preserving spread of G. Due to convexity of the payoff function, the regulator would optimally select
G∗ = F , to maximize the ex ante expectation of firm value.
A complication arises when the firm has control over whether to disclose information, as the regulator
must anticipate the consequences of the choice of G on the voluntary disclosure subgame. Namely, even
though the firm (probabilistically) observes information generated by G, the market only sees the informa-
tion that the firm elects to disclose. Therefore, the regulator’s ex ante expectation of firm value should not
be taken with respect to the measurement system G, but instead with respect to another distribution, denoted
HG, which is distribution of posterior means in the disclosure subgame (the subscript “G” in HG represents
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the fact that the subgame distribution of posteriors is a function of what measurement system the regulator
imposes).
Specifically, we can compute HG as follows. First, let
DG ≡ {x ∈ supp G : φ(x)− c ≥ φ(μ(nd; G))}
denote the disclosure region, that is, the realizations of X (in the support of G) such that the manager
prefers disclosure over nondisclosure for a given nondisclosure expectation μ(nd; G). Further, let NDG ≡
supp G \ DG denote the strategic nondisclosure region, that is, the complement of the disclosure region in
the support of G. Given the disclosure and nondisclosure regions, the market’s rational posterior expectation
of the asset value conditional on nondisclosure is
μ(nd; G) =
qE(V ) + (1− q)P(NDG)E (X|X ∈ NDG)
q + (1− q)P(NDG) .
25 (B.11)
The expectation μ(nd; G) is a convex combination of the prior mean, E(V ), and the expectation conditional
on nondisclosure, E (X|X ∈ NDG). The weight on the conditional on the prior mean is the posterior
probability that no verifiable information exists, given by the prior probability of no verifiable information,
q, divided by the total probability of nonstrategic and strategic withholding, q + (1− q)P(NDG).
Second, note that if there exists a type x in the support of G that prefers disclosure over nondisclosure
(i.e., such that φ(x) − c ≥ φ(μ(nd; G))), then all types x′ > x also prefer disclosure over nondisclosure.
Thus, an equilibrium is characterized by a marginal discloser, denoted xˆ(G), such that all types x ≥ xˆ(G)
disclose and all x < xˆ(G) withhold. If the disclosure region DG is empty, we set xˆ(G) = v.
With this notation, the distribution of posterior means as is observed by the market is
HG(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, μ(nd; G))
q + (1− q)P(NDG) if x ∈ [μ(nd; G), xˆ(G))
q + (1− q)P(X ≤ x) if x ∈ [xˆ(G), v]
. (B.12)
25By the law of iterated expectations, we can write E (X|X ∈ NDG) in place E (V |X ∈ NDG), as X is the
posterior expectation of the asset value (i.e., E(V |X) = X). Also, we write ∫NDG xdG(x) = P(NDG)E(X|X ∈NDG) because at an optimum the set of strategic withholders is nonempty as per Lemma B.4 in the Appendix.
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The expression in (B.12) necessitates a few comments. Recall that HG is a distribution function, and so
it measures the probability that the posterior mean X ≤ x. As such, HG equals zero for all values less
than the nondisclosure expectation, because none of these values (even if they are on the support of G) are
disclosed in equilibrium. At x = μ(nd; G), the distribution has a discrete jump, because the nondisclosure
expectation realizes when the firm has no verifiable information (with probability q) and when the firm is
strategically withholding (with probability (1 − q)P(NDG)). The distribution then stays constant until x
reaches the lowest value in the support of G such that disclosure is preferred over nondisclosure. From that
point on, HG (weakly) increases with x until the upper bound of the support, where HG equals one because
all informed lower types either withhold or disclose.
The following Lemma combines the previous discussion with Definitions 1 and 2 to provide a mathe-
matical formulation of optimal measurements.
Lemma B.1 A measurement G∗ is optimal if it solves
max
G
∫ v
0
φ′′(x)S(x; HG)dx
s.t.
[MPS] S(x; G) ≤ S(x; F ) for all x ∈ [0, v], with equality for x = v
[BP ] μ(nd; G) is given by (B.11) and HG is given by (B.12),
where S(x; G) ≡ ∫ x0 G(y)dy.
The objective function is obtained by integrating by parts twice the unconditional expectation of firm
value taken with respect to the distribution HG.26 The label [MPS] for the first constraint stands for “mean-
preserving spread”, as is states a necessary and sufficient condition for F to be a mean-preserving spread of
G.27 The second constraint is labeled [BP ] as a mnemonics for “Bayesian plausibility”, and summarizes
26The steps are as follows,∫ x
0
φ(x)dHG(x) = v −
∫ v
0
φ′(x)HG(x)dx = v − φ′(v)S(v; HG) +
∫ v
0
φ′′(x)S(x; HG)dx.
Then, we observe that the first two terms, v−φ′(v)S(v; HG), are independent of G, because HG is a mean-preserving
spread of F and so S(v; HG) = S(v; F ). Hence, only the last term is relevant for optimization purposes.
27Equality of the means is implied by the condition S(v; G) = S(v; F ). This fact can be seen by integrating by
parts the unconditional expectation,
∫ v
0
xdG(x) = v − S(v; G).
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the equilibrium of the disclosure subgame. We name this constraint as such because the unconditional
expectation with respect to HG equals the unconditional expectation of the asset value, E(V ).
B.2 Characterization of the equilibrium in the disclosure subgame
Given our relatively unusual setting for the voluntary disclosure subgame, we say a few words on the equi-
librium derivation when the posterior mean follows a generic distribution G.
Since the distribution G of posterior means might feature discrete jumps in correspondence with values
that have positive probability mass, integrals in the analysis are to be intepreted as Lebesgue-Stieltjes inte-
grals.28 We specify whether the limits of integration are included or excluded, unless it makes no difference.
We use G(x−) to denote the left limit of G at a point x. The right limit of G at a point x is simply G(x),
because distribution functions are right-continuous.
Let xˆ be the marginal discloser. The equilibrium nondisclosure price must equal
μ(nd; G) =
qE(V ) + (1− q) ∫[0,xˆ) xdG(x)
q + (1− q)G(xˆ−)
=
qE(V ) + (1− q) [xˆG(xˆ−)− S(xˆ; G)]
q + (1− q)G(xˆ−) ≡ Υ(xˆ; G),
(B.13)
where the second line uses integration by parts for distribution functions. The function Υ(xˆ; G) in (B.13) is
the expectation of asset value conditional on nondisclosure and is obtained as follows: with probability q the
firm has no verifiable information, so the expected asset value in this event is the unconditional mean E(V );
with probabiltiy (1−q)G(xˆ−) the firm is withholding information, so the expected asset value is conditional
on the event X < xˆ (with strict inequality because the marginal discloser discloses). A marginal discloser
xˆ is part of an equilibrium if φ(xˆ) − c ≥ φ(Υ(xˆ; G)) (implying that all types greater than xˆ disclose) and
φ(x)− c < φ(Υ(xˆ; G)) for all x < xˆ in the support of G (implying that all types smaller than xˆ withhold).
If there are multiple equilibria in the voluntary disclosure subgame, we select the equilibrium with
the highest ex ante expectation of firm value. Analogous equilibrium selection criteria are common in the
disclosure literature (e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Hart, Kremer and Perry, 2017; Rappoport, 2017).
Lemma B.2 below identifies the subgame equilibrium that maximizes the ex ante firm value as the one with
28We cannot restrict the attention to only distribution of posterior means that admit a density because partitional
signal structures imply a distribution that is not absolutely continuous, since it features non-zero mass at certain points
(e.g., all states within an interval yield the same posterior).
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the lowest marginal discloser.
Lemma B.2 Fix the distribution of posterior means G and the disclosure cost c. Let
X+ ≡ {x ∈ supp G : φ(x)− c ≥ φ(Υ(x; G))} .
(i) If X+ is empty, then nondisclosure by all types is the only equilibrium of the voluntary disclosure
subgame.
(ii) If X+ is nonempty, then an equilibrium exists where the treshold type is xˆc = minX+. Moreover,
among all equilibria, ex ante firm value is maximal in this equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma B.2. In part (i), the disclosure cost is so high that no type has an incentive to separate
from the nondisclosing types (namely, the set X+ is empty). Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome is
nondisclosure by all types.
In part (ii), some types have an incentive to separate. We prove part (ii) in a series of steps. Step 1
below argues that minX+ exists. Step 2 shows that the threshold identified in this way is part of a subgame
equilibrium for the case c = 0. Step 3 generalizes Step 2 to the case c > 0. Step 4 argues that in all other
equilibria (which may or may not exist), ex ante firm value is lower than in the equilibrium with marginal
discloser xˆc = minX+.
Step 1. minX+ exists.
Proof of Step 1. Suppose not. Then, for any x ∈ X+ there exists an x′ ∈ X+ such that x′ < x.
Therefore, it is possible to construct a decreasing sequence {xn} in X+. Such a sequence must converge
to a limit because x ≥ 0 implies that X+ is bounded from below. Call xˆ the limit of this sequence. For
a minimum not to exist, we must have xˆ /∈ X+. However, xˆ ∈ supp G because the support of a random
variable is a closed set. Also, we now argue that φ(xˆ)− c ≥ φ(Υ(xˆ; G)), which together with xˆ ∈ supp G
implies the contradiction that the limit xˆ ∈ X+. To show that the inequality holds in the limit, first observe
that the left-hand side, φ(xn)− c, converges to φ(xˆ)− c. Second, observe that Υ(xn; G) converges to
Υ˜(xˆ; G) ≡ qE(V ) + (1− q) [xˆG(xˆ)− S(xˆ; G)]
q + (1− q)G(xˆ) =
qE(V ) + (1− q) ∫[0,xˆ] xdG(x)
q + (1− q)G(xˆ) ,
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which is the expectation conditional on the firm being uninformed or informed with X ≤ xˆ.29 The inclusion
of X = xˆ in the conditional expectation is what differentiates Υ˜(xˆ; G) from Υ(xˆ; G). Since inequalities are
preserved in the limit, we have φ(xˆ) − c ≥ φ(Υ˜(xˆ; G)). From the latter inequality, we have xˆ ≥ Υ˜(xˆ; G),
which in turn implies Υ˜(xˆ; G) ≥ Υ(xˆ; G), as we are removing from the conditional expectation Υ˜(xˆ; G) a
realization, xˆ, which is greater that the expectation itself.30 Overall, φ(xˆ)− c ≥ φ(Υ˜(xˆ; G)) ≥ φ(Υ(xˆ; G))
and so we reach the contradiction that xˆ ∈ X+.
Step 2. The threshold xˆ0 = minX+ is part of an equilibrium when c = 0.
Proof of Step 2. Since xˆ0 (weakly) prefers disclosure over nondisclosure, all x > xˆ0 strictly prefer
disclosure. There remains to check that all types x < xˆ0 prefer nondisclosure over disclosure. When c = 0,
the condition φ(x) − c < φ(Υ(xˆ0; G)) is equivalent to x < Υ(xˆ0; G) (because φ is strictly increasing).
By contradiction, suppose that there existed a type x < xˆ0 such that x ≥ Υ(xˆ0; G). Then, we would have
Υ(x; G) ≤ Υ(xˆ0; G), because we are removing from the conditional expectationΥ(xˆ0; G) the types [x, xˆ0),
which are greater than the expectation itself.31 As a consequence, x ≥ Υ(xˆ0; G) ≥ Υ(x; G), contradicting
the fact that x /∈ X+. We conclude that x < Υ(xˆ0; G) for all types x < xˆ0.
Step 3.1. x < Υ(x; G) for all x < xˆ0 (if there are any such types).
Proof of Step 3.1. We know from the proof of Step 2 that x < Υ(xˆ0; G) for all types x < xˆ0. Hence,
Υ(x; G) ≥ Υ(xˆ0; G), because we are removing from the conditional expectation Υ(xˆ0; G) the types in
[x, xˆ0), which are lower than the expectation itself. So, x < Υ(xˆ0; G) ≤ Υ(x; G).
Step 3.2. When c > 0, all types x < xˆ0 (if there are any) prefer nondisclosure over disclosure. Further,
xˆc ≥ xˆ0.
29Convergence of Υ(x; G) to Υ˜(xˆ; G) as x ↓ xˆ follows from G(xˆ) ≤ G(x−) ≤ G(x) (because x > xˆ and G is
nondecreasing) and G(x) ↓ G(xˆ) (because G is right-continuous). Hence, limx↓xˆ G(x−) = G(xˆ).
30Formally, if the point xˆ has no probability mass (i.e., G(xˆ) − G(xˆ−) = 0), then adding the type x = xˆ to the
conditional expectation Υ(xˆ; G) is immaterial, and so Υ˜(xˆ; G) = Υ(xˆ; G). Conversely, if there is probability mass on
the point xˆ (i.e., G(xˆ)−G(xˆ−) > 0), then
Υ˜(xˆ; G) =
[q + (1− q)G(xˆ−)]Υ(xˆ; G) + (1− q) [G(xˆ)−G(xˆ−)] xˆ
q + (1− q)G(xˆ) ≥ Υ(xˆ; G)
if and only if xˆ ≥ Υ(xˆ; G), as is the case.
31The latter claim follows from the fact that the inequality
Υ(x; G) =
[q + (1− q)G(xˆ0−)]Υ(xˆ0; G)− (1− q)
∫
[x,xˆ0)
ydG(y)
q + (1− q)G(x−) ≤ Υ(xˆ0; G)
boils down to
∫
[x,xˆ0)
[Υ(xˆ0; G)− y]dy ≤ 0, which holds because y ≥ Υ(xˆ0; G) for all y ∈ [x, xˆ0).
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Proof of Step 3.2. From Step 3.1, we know that x < Υ(x; G) and so φ(x) − c < φ(Υ(x; G)). Thus,
x /∈ X+ for all x < xˆ0 and we must have xˆc ≥ xˆ0.
Step 3.3. x > Υ(x; G) for all x > xˆ0 (if there are any such types).
Proof of Step 3.3. Υ(x; G) is obtained by adding to the conditional expectation Υ(xˆ0; G), which is
smaller than x, the types in [xˆ0, x), which are also smaller than x. In particular, we have
Υ(x; G) =
[q + (1− q)G(xˆ0−)]Υ(xˆ0; G) + (1− q)
∫
[xˆ0,x)
ydG(y)
q + (1− q)G(x−) < x
if and only if
[q + (1− q)G(xˆ0−)] [x−Υ(xˆ0)] + (1− q)
∫
[xˆ0,x)
(x− y)dG(y) > 0.
The inequality above holds because x > xˆ0 ≥ Υ(xˆ0; G).
Step 3.4. The threshold xˆc = minX+ is part of an equilibrium when c > 0.
Proof of Step 3.4. By Steps 3.1 and 3.2, it suffices to check that all types x ∈ [xˆ0, xˆc) (if there are any)
prefer nondisclosure over disclosure. These types withhold because φ(x)−c < φ(Υ(x; G)) ≤ φ(Υ(xˆc; G)).
The first inequality follows from x /∈ X+. The second inequality from Step 3.3, because Υ(xˆc; G) is
obtained by adding to the conditional expectation Υ(x; G) the types [x, xˆc), which are greater than the
expectation itself. Therefore, Υ(xˆc; G) ≥ Υ(x; G).
Step 4. Across all equilibria, the greatest ex ante firm value is achieved in the equilibrium with marginal
discloser xˆc.
Proof of Step 4. Suppose that there is another equilibrium with threshold xˆ > xˆc. Consider the event
X ≥ xˆ. The probability of this event, ∫[xˆ,v] dH(x) = (1− q)[1−G(xˆ−)], and the distribution of X|X ≥ xˆ
are the same in both equilibria. These facts have two consequences. First, the expected firm value condi-
tional on this event,
∫
[xˆ,v] φ(x)d
H(x)
(1−q)[1−G(xˆ−)] , is the same in both equilibria. Second, the expected asset
value conditional on the complement event,
∫
[0,xˆ) xd
H(x)
q+(1−q)G(xˆ−) , is the same in both equilibria.
32 The
distribution of X|X < xˆ in the equilibrium with threshold xˆc is a mean-preserving spread of the distribu-
tion of X|X < xˆ in the equilibrium with threshold xˆ, because the latter distribution is degenerate at the
nondisclosure expectation (all types x < xˆ withhold in that equilibrium). Since firm value is convex in the
32The claim exploits the law of iterated expectations, by which E(X|X < xˆ) = [E(V ) − P(X ≥ xˆ)E(X|X ≥
xˆ)]/[1− P(X ≥ xˆ)].
52
posterior mean, the ex ante expected firm value is greater in the equilibrium with threshold xˆc than in the
one with threshold xˆ.
B.3 A partitional representation
Next, we reduce the complexity of the choice by showing the optimality of a single imprecise interval [t, a2].
That is, if V /∈ [t, a2], then the manager can credibly convey the exact realization of the asset value (i.e., the
verifiable signal is X = V ). By constrast, if V ∈ [t, a2], then the manager can credibly convey only the fact
that the realized asset value belongs to that interval (i.e., the verifiable signal is X = E[V |t ≤ V ≤ a2]).
Proposition 5 Fix the disclosure cost c ≥ 0. IfG∗ is an optimal measurement, then there exist t∗ ≤ xˆ∗ ≤ a∗2
such that:
(i) xˆ∗ = E[V |t∗ ≤ V ≤ a∗2];
(ii) μ(nd; G∗) = qE(V ) + (1− q)F (t
∗)E[V |V < t∗]
q + (1− q)F (t∗) ;
(iii) φ(xˆ∗)− c = φ(μ(nd; G∗)); and
(iv) the equilibrium distribution of posterior means in the disclosure subgame is
HG∗(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, μ(nd; G∗))
q + (1− q)F (t∗) if x ∈ [μ(nd; G∗), xˆ∗)
q + (1− q)F (a∗2) if x ∈ [xˆ∗, a∗2]
q + (1− q)F (x) if x ∈ (a∗2, v]
.33 (B.14)
The distribution of posterior means in (B.14) is determined as follows. Starting from (B.12), plug in the
specific values for P(NDG∗) and P(X ≤ x) that apply in the case with an imprecise interval. First, we
have that P(NDG∗) = F (t∗), because the probability of strategic withholding is the probability of the
33As for the costless disclosure case of Proposition 1, note how Proposition 5 does not specify what the measurement
system should be for realizations x < t∗. The reason is that these values are withheld in equilibrium and, consequently,
they do not belong to the support of the distribution of posterior means as are observed by the market, HG∗ . Hence,
there are multiple optimal measurements that agree on x ≥ t∗ but differ on x < t∗. For example, an optimal
measurement can feature either perfect measurement of x < t∗ or a mass point at E(V |V < t∗).
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realized value being less than the lower bound of the imprecise interval. Second, P(X ≤ x) = F (a∗2) for
all x ∈ [xˆ∗, a∗2], because all realized values in [t∗, a∗2] are pooled together. Last, P(X ≤ x) = F (x) for
x ∈ (a∗2, v], because above the upper bound of the imprecise interval the measurement is precise and the
sender discloses his signal.
B.3.1 Preliminary observations
We prove this Proposition relying on several lemmas. Let G∗ be an optimal measurement. An initial
observation is that G∗ must induce disclosure by a positive mass of types. This statement is formalized in
the following Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.3 At the optimum, the disclosure region, DG∗ , is nonempty. Therefore, part (ii) of Lemma B.2
applies and the marginal discloser is xˆ∗ = minX+.
Proof of Lemma B.3. If G∗ were such that (almost) all informed types chose nondisclosure, the distribu-
tion of posterior means HG∗ would be degenerate at x = E(V ). By constrast, if the regulator chose perfect
measurement (i.e., G = F ), types close to the upper bound v would disclose, because φ(v)− c > φ(E(V ))
(our working assumption throughout) and φ(E(V )) ≥ φ(μ(nd; F )) (as μ(nd; F ) is a convex combination
between the prior mean, E(V ), and an expectation truncated from above). Therefore, the equilibrium distri-
bution of posterior means under perfect measurement, HF , would be nondegenerate and, as such, would be
a mean-preserving spread of HG∗ . Since the objective function is convex, the ex ante expected firm value is
strictly greater under HF than under HG∗ , so G∗ cannot be an optimal measurement.
A second observation is that G∗ must induce strategic withholding by a positive mass of types, as stated
by Lemma B.4 below.
Lemma B.4 At the optimum, the strategic withholding region, NDG∗ , has positive mass. Therefore,∫
NDG∗ xdG
∗(x) = P(NDG∗)E(X|X ∈ NDG∗).
Proof of Lemma B.4. By contradiction, suppose that P(NDG∗) = 0. Then, μ(nd; G∗) = E(V ). Since
almost all types disclose, φ(x) − c ≥ φ(E(V )), and thus also x ≥ E(V ), for almost all x. By the law of
iterated expectations, G∗, and so also HG∗ , are degenerate at x = E(V ). As we have seen in the proof of
Lemma B.3, the regulator would strictly prefer perfect measurement G = F to G∗, so G∗ is not optimal.
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A third observation is that there must exist a t = max{x ∈ V : x ≤ xˆ∗ and S(x; G∗) = S(x; F )},
because this set is compact (as S(x; G) is continuous in x) and nonempty (as S(0; G∗) = S(0; F )). Also,
there must exist an a2 = min{x ∈ V : x ≥ xˆ∗ and S(x; G∗) = S(x; F )}, because this set is compact and
nonempty (as S(v; G∗) = S(v; F ) by the [MPS] constraint). The following Lemma B.5 describes some
useful properties of t and a2 that are implied by the equality S(x; G∗) = S(x; F ). We know from Lemma
3 in Dworczak and Martini (2018) that such x satisfies G(x) = F (x). On top of that, we show that G must
be continuous at x (i.e., G(x−) = G(x)).
Lemma B.5 Suppose that the distribution F is a mean-preserving spread of G. If x ∈ V is such that
S(x; G) = S(x; F ), then G(x−) = G(x) = F (x).
Proof of Lemma B.5. If x = v, then because both F and G are distributions we must haveG(v) = F (v) =
1. So, suppose for the remainder of the proof that x ∈ [0, v). We make two observations:
- First, we argue that if x ∈ [0, v), then G(x) ≤ F (x). By contradiction, suppose that G(x) > F (x). For
z > x, S(z; G) = S(x; G)+
∫ z
x G(y)dy and S(z; F ) = S(x; F )+
∫ z
x F (y)dy. Since S(x; G) = S(x; F ),
S(z; F ) − S(z; G) = ∫ zx [F (y)−G(y)]dy. Because F and G are right-continuous and G(x) > F (x),
there exists a z > x such that S(z; F ) − S(z; G) < 0, contradicting the fact that F is a mean-preserving
spread of G. Thus, it must be G(x) ≤ F (x).
- Second, we argue that if x ∈ (0, v), thenG(x−) ≥ F (x). For z < x, S(z; G) = S(x; G)−
∫ x
z G(y)dy and
S(z; F ) = S(x; F )− ∫ xz F (y)dy. Since S(x; G) = S(x; F ), S(z; F )−S(z; G) = ∫ xz [G(y)− F (y)]dy.
Suppose, by contradiction, that G(x−) < F (x). Then, by continuity of F there would exist a z < x such
that S(z; F )−S(z; G) < 0, contradicting the fact that F is a mean-preserving spread of G. Thus, it must
be G(x−) ≥ F (x).
If x = 0, F (0) = 0, by the first observation 0 ≤ G(0) ≤ F (0) = 0, hence G(0) = 0 = F (0) and the proof
is concluded. If x > 0, by the first observation we have G(x) ≤ F (x), while by the second observation we
have G(x) ≥ G(x−) ≥ F (x). Hence, G(x) = G(x−) = F (x).
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For future reference, note that using the notation P(NDG∗) = G∗(xˆ∗−) and P(X ≤ x) = G(x), the
equilibrium distribution of posterior means in (B.12) can be rewritten as
HG∗(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, μ(nd; G))
q + (1− q)G∗(xˆ∗−) if x ∈ [μ(nd; G), xˆ∗)
q + (1− q)G∗(x) if x ∈ [xˆ∗, v]
. (B.15)
B.3.2 Overview of the proof of Proposition 5
The objective is to show that G∗ is a partitional measurement with imprecise interval [t, a2], where the end
points of this interval are defined as above. We summarize below the steps involved in the proof:
Step 1. Lemma B.6 shows that the optimal measurement must involve perfect measurement of all V > a2.
Equivalently, the distributions of the signal X|X > a2 and of the asset value V |V > a2 must
coincide.
Step 2. We argue that, of all the values in the interval [t, a2], only x = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2) is in the support
of the optimal measurement. Namely:
Step 2.1. Lemma B.7 shows that G∗(xˆ∗) = G∗(a2) = F (a2), so the c.d.f. G∗ is flat on [xˆ∗, a2];
Step 2.2. Lemma B.8 shows that G∗(xˆ∗−) = G∗(t) = F (t),34 so G∗ is flat on [t, xˆ∗);
Step 2.3. Lemma B.9 shows that the marginal discloser is xˆ∗ = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2).
Step 3. Lemma B.10 shows that the marginal discloser must be exactly indifferent between disclosure and
nondisclosure.
B.3.3 The lemmas that imply Proposition 5
At this point, we proceed to state and prove the lemmas mentioned above.
Lemma B.6 G∗(x) = F (x) for all x ∈ [a2, v].
34We use G(x−) to denote the left limit of G at point x.
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Proof of Lemma B.6. If a2 = v, then G∗(a2) = F (a2) = 1 and the proof is concluded. So, suppose
instead that a2 < v. By Lemma B.5, if F is a mean-preserving spread of G and S(x; G) = S(x; F ) for
some x, then G(x) = F (x). Thus, we have G∗(a2) = F (a2) and there remains to verify the claim on the
lemma for x ∈ (a2, v].
Recall that we denote by HG the c.d.f. of the posterior mean when the measurement system is G. The
[BP] constraint and (B.15) imply that [q +(1− q)G(xˆ−)]μ(nd; G) = qE(V )+(1− q)[xˆG(xˆ−)−S(xˆ; G)].
Hence, the integral of the c.d.f. HG takes the form
S(x; HG) =

0 if x ∈ [0, μ(nd; G))
q(x− E(V )) + (1− q) [(x− xˆ)G(xˆ−) + S(xˆ; G)] if x ∈ [μ(nd; G), xˆ)
q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; G) if x ∈ [xˆ, v]
. (B.16)
Further, by Lemma 5 and (B.16), the value of the objective function in equilibrium is
∫ v
0
φ′′(x)S(x; HG∗)dx =
∫ a2
0
φ′′(x)S(x; HG∗)dx +
∫ v
a2
φ′′(x) [q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; G)] dx.
(B.17)
The [MPS] constraint imposes the inequality S(x; G∗) ≤ S(x; F ). To maximize the second term in the
right-hand side of (B.17), the distributions ofX|X > a2 and V |V > a2 must be the same, so that S(x; G) =
S(x; F ) for all x ∈ (a2, v].
Lemma B.7 G∗(xˆ∗) = F (a2).
Proof of Lemma B.7. If a2 = xˆ∗, then G∗(xˆ∗) = G∗(a2) = F (a2) (the second equality by Lemma B.6),
which concludes the proof. If instead a2 > xˆ∗, suppose by contradiction that F (a2) > G∗(xˆ∗). Then, let
a2 ≡ max{xˆ∗, F−1(G∗(xˆ∗))}. We argue that the following measurement system strictly improves the ex
ante firm value,
G∗∗(x) =

G∗(x) if x ∈ [0, xˆ∗)
F (a′2) if x ∈ [xˆ∗, a′2]
F (x) if x ∈ (a′2, v]
,
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where a′2 ∈ (a2, a2) solves
S(a′2; G
∗∗) = S(a′2; F ). (B.18)
The condition a′2 > a2 guarantees that both a′2 > xˆ∗ and F (a′2) > G∗(xˆ∗), so that the c.d.f. G∗∗ is
nondecreasing. Also, note that S(a′2; G∗∗) = S(xˆ∗; G∗) +
∫ a′2
xˆ∗ F (a
′
2)dx. Existence of a solution a′2 to
(B.18) is established as follows:
- If a2 = xˆ∗, then (B.18) evaluated at a′2 = a2 becomes S(xˆ∗; G∗) < S(xˆ∗; F ) by the definition of a2
being the smallest x ≥ xˆ∗ such that S(x; G∗) = S(x; F ). If a2 = F−1(G∗(xˆ∗)), then (B.18) evaluated
at a′2 = a2 becomes S(xˆ∗; G∗) +
∫ a2
xˆ∗ G
∗(xˆ∗)dx < S(a2; F ), because S(xˆ∗; G∗) +
∫ a2
xˆ∗ G
∗(xˆ∗)dx ≤
S(xˆ∗; G∗) +
∫ a2
xˆ∗ G
∗(x)dx = S(a2; G∗) (as G∗ is nondecreasing) and S(a2; G∗) < S(a2; F ) (by the
definition of a2). In either case, when evaluated at a′2 = a2, the left-hand side of (B.18) is strictly smaller
than the right-hand side.
- By contrast, when evaluated at a′2 = a2, equation (B.18) becomes S(xˆ∗; G∗)+
∫ a2
xˆ∗ F (a2)dx > S(a2; F ),
because S(xˆ∗; G∗) +
∫ a2
xˆ∗ F (a2)dx = S(a2; G
∗) +
∫ a2
xˆ∗ [F (a2)−G∗(x)]dx > S(a2; G∗) (as G∗(x) ≤
F (a2) for x ≤ a2, with strict inequality in a neighborhood to the right of xˆ∗ due to G∗(xˆ∗) < F (a2)
and G∗ being right-continuous) and S(a2; G∗) = S(a2; F ) (by the definition of a2). Therefore, when
evaluated at a′2 = a2, the left-hand side of (B.18) is strictly larger than the right-hand side.
- Continuity implies existence of a a′2 ∈ (a2, a2) satisfying (B.18).
We need to verify that G∗∗ satisfies the [MPS] condition, so that it is a feasible measurement system:
- For x ∈ [0, xˆ∗], G∗ and G∗∗ coincide, so S(x; G∗∗) = S(x; G∗) ≤ S(x; F ), because G∗ satisfies [MPS].
- For x ∈ (xˆ∗, a′2), we have S(x; G∗∗) = S(a′2; G∗∗)−
∫ a′2
x F (a
′
2)dy ≤ S(a′2; F )−
∫ a′2
x F (y)dy = S(x; F )
if and only if
∫ a′2
x [F (y)− F (a′2)]dy ≤ 0 (because S(a′2; G∗∗) = S(a′2; F ) by definition of a′2). The
inequality holds because F is increasing.
- For x ∈ [a′2, v], S(x; G∗∗) = S(a′2; G∗∗) +
∫ x
a′2
F (y)dy = S(a′2; F ) +
∫ x
a′2
F (y)dy = S(x; F ). In
particular, S(v; G∗∗) = S(v; F ), which implies equality of means.
Finally, we show that the objective function in Lemma 5 is strictly greater when evaluated at G∗∗ than at
G∗. For this purpose, it suffices to show that S(x; HG∗) ≤ S(x; HG∗∗) for all x ∈ V , with strict inequality
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on a subset of positive Lebesgue measure.
- For x ∈ [0, xˆ∗], G∗ and G∗∗ coincide. Hence, by equation (B.13) we have μ(nd; G∗) = μ(nd; G∗∗) and
by equation (B.16) we have S(x; HG∗) = S(x; HG∗∗).
- For all x > xˆ∗ we have S(x; HG) = q(x − E(V )) + (1 − q)S(x; G) by equation (B.13). Therefore, the
inequality to check is S(x; G∗∗) ≥ S(x; G∗).
- For x ∈ (xˆ∗, a′2), S(x; G∗∗) − S(x; G∗) =
∫ x
xˆ∗ [F (a
′
2)−G∗(y)]dy. This difference is nonnegative if
G∗(x) ≤ F (a′2). If instead G∗(x) > F (a′2), then G∗(y) > F (a′2) for all y > x and so S(x; G∗∗) −
S(x; G∗) ≥ S(a′2; G∗∗) − S(a′2; G∗). By the definition of a′2, S(a′2; G∗∗) − S(a′2; G∗) = S(a′2; F ) −
S(a′2; G∗). By the definition of a2, S(a′2; F ) − S(a′2; G∗) > 0. Hence, S(x; G∗∗) ≥ S(x; G∗) for all
x ∈ (xˆ∗, a′2).
- For x ∈ [a′2, a2), S(x; G∗∗) = S(x; F ) > S(x; G∗).
- For x ∈ [a2, v], by Lemma B.6 we have S(x; G∗∗) = S(x; G∗) = S(x; F ).
Overall, we have shown that if F (a2) > G∗(xˆ∗), then there is another measurement system, G∗∗, that
satisfies [MPS] and strictly increases ex ante firm value relative to G∗. Therefore, such a G∗ cannot be
optimal.
Lemma B.8 G∗(xˆ∗−) = G∗(t) = F (t).
Proof of Lemma B.8. Lemma B.5 implies G∗(t) = F (t). If t = xˆ∗, Lemma B.5 also directly implies
the claim G∗(t) = G∗(xˆ∗−). Suppose instead that t < xˆ∗. By way of contradiction, further suppose that
F (t) < G∗(xˆ∗−). Then, let t ≡ min{xˆ∗, F−1(G∗(xˆ∗−))}. We now show that the following measurement
system strictly increases the ex ante firm value,
G∗∗(x) =

F (x) if x ∈ [0, t′)
F (t′) if x ∈ [t′, xˆ∗)
G∗(x) if x ∈ [xˆ∗, v]
,
where t′ ∈ (t, t) solves
S(xˆ∗; G∗∗) = S(xˆ∗; G∗). (B.19)
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The condition t′ < t guarantees that both t′ < xˆ∗ and F (t′) < G∗(xˆ∗−), so that the c.d.f. G∗∗ is nondecreas-
ing. Also, note that S(xˆ∗; G∗∗) = S(t′; F )+
∫ xˆ∗
t′ F (t
′)dx. Existence of a solution t′ to (B.19) is established
as follows:
- When evaluated at t′ = t, equation (B.19) becomes S(t; F )+∫ xˆ∗t F (t)dx < S(xˆ∗; G∗), because S(t; F )+∫ xˆ∗
t F (t)dx = S(t; G
∗) +
∫ xˆ∗
t F (t)dx (by the definition of t being such that S(t; F ) = S(t; G∗)) and
S(t; G∗) +
∫ xˆ∗
t F (t)dx < S(xˆ
∗; G∗) = S(t; G∗) +
∫ xˆ∗
t G
∗(x)dx. The latter inequality holds if and only
if
∫ xˆ∗
t [G
∗(x)− F (t)]dx > 0, which is satisfied because G∗(x) ≥ G∗(t) = F (t) for x > t (by Lemma
B.5), with strict equality in a neighborhood to the left of xˆ∗ (because we are assuming, by contradiction,
that F (t) < G∗(xˆ∗−)).
- If t = xˆ∗, then (B.19) evaluated at t′ = t becomes S(xˆ∗; F ) > S(xˆ∗; G∗) by the definition of t being
the greatest x ≤ xˆ∗ such that S(x; F ) = S(x; G∗). If t = F−1(G∗(xˆ∗−)), then (B.19) evaluated at
t′ = t becomes S(t; F ) +
∫ xˆ∗
t G
∗(xˆ∗−)dx > S(xˆ∗; G∗), because S(t; F ) +
∫ xˆ∗
t G
∗(xˆ∗−)dx ≥ S(t; F ) +∫ xˆ∗
t G
∗(x)dx (because G∗ is nondecreasing) and S(t; F ) > S(xˆ∗; G∗) − ∫ xˆ∗t G∗(x)dx = S(t; G∗) (by
the definition of t). In either case, when evaluated at t′ = t, the left-hand side of (B.19) is strictly greater
than the right-hand side.
- Continuity implies existence of a t′ ∈ (t, t) satisfying (B.19).
We need to verify that G∗∗ satisfies the [MPS] condition, so that it is a feasible measurement system:
- For x ∈ [0, t′], G∗∗ and F coincide, so S(x; G∗∗) = S(x; F ).
- For x ∈ (t′, xˆ∗), we have S(x; G∗∗) = S(t′; G∗∗) + ∫ xt′ F (t′)dy ≤ S(t; F ) + ∫ xt′ F (y)dy = S(x; F ) if
and only if
∫ x
t′ [F (t
′)− F (y)]dy ≤ 0 (because S(t′; G∗∗) = S(t′; F )). The inequality holds because F is
increasing.
- For x ∈ [xˆ∗, v], S(x; G∗∗) = S(xˆ∗; G∗∗) + ∫ xxˆ∗ G∗(y)dy = S(xˆ∗; G∗) + ∫ xxˆ∗ G∗(y)dy = S(x; G∗),
because S(xˆ∗; G∗) = S(xˆ∗; G∗∗) by (B.19). We have S(x; G∗∗) = S(x; G∗) ≤ S(x; F ) because G∗
satisfies [MPS].
- Equality of the means is satisfied because S(v; G∗∗) = S(v; G∗), and G∗ has the same mean as F .
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Last, we show that the objective function in Lemma 5 is strictly greater when evaluated at G∗∗ than at
G∗. We consider separately two cases: when φ(t′)− c < φ(Υ(t′; F )) and when φ(t′)− c ≥ φ(Υ(t′; F )).
Proof for Case φ(t′) − c < φ(Υ(t′; F )). In this case, under the measurement G∗∗ there exists an
equilibrium with threshold xˆ∗ and nondisclosure expectation
μ(nd; G∗∗) =
qE(V ) + (1− q)[xˆ∗G∗∗(xˆ∗−)− S(xˆ∗; G∗∗)]
q + (1− q)G∗∗(xˆ∗−)
=
qE(V ) + (1− q)[xˆ∗F (t′)− S(t′; F )− (xˆ∗ − t′)F (t′)]
q + (1− q)F (t′) = Υ(t
′; F ),
where the second equality uses the definition of G∗∗. This combination of marginal discloser and nondis-
closure expectation constitutes an equilibrium of the disclosure subgame for the following reasons:
- Notice that Υ(t′; F ) ≤ μ(nd; G∗), because
Υ(t′; F ) =
qE(V ) + (1− q)[xˆ∗F (t′)− S(xˆ∗; G∗)]
q + (1− q)F (t′)
≤ qE(V ) + (1− q)[xˆ
∗G∗(xˆ∗−)− S(xˆ∗; G∗)]
q + (1− q)G∗(xˆ∗−)
= μ(nd; G∗),
where the equality follows from (B.19) and the inequality from F (t′) < G∗(xˆ∗−).35
- Types x ≥ xˆ∗ strictly prefers disclosure, because φ(xˆ∗) − c ≥ φ(μ(nd; G∗)) (as xˆ∗ weakly preferred
disclosure under measurement G∗) and μ(nd; G∗) ≥ Υ(t′; F ) (from the previous observation).
- Values x ∈ (t′, xˆ∗) are not in the support of G∗∗.
- Types x ≤ t′ strictly prefer nondisclosure by the assumption for this case.
For future reference, note that in this equilibrium the distribution of posterior means from the market’s
perspective is
HˆG∗∗(x) ≡

0 if x ∈ [0, Υ(t′; F ))
q + (1− q)F (t′) if x ∈ [Υ(t′; F ), xˆ∗)
q + (1− q)G∗(x) if x ∈ [xˆ∗, v]
. (B.20)
Using (B.16), we compare the ex ante firm value between the regulator preferred equilibrium under G∗
35Namely, when F (t′) < G∗(xˆ∗−), Υ(t′; F ) ≤ μ(nd; G) if and only if q(E(V ) − xˆ∗) − (1 − q)S(xˆ∗; G∗) ≤ 0,
which holds if xˆ∗ ≥ μ(nd; G∗). The last inequality is implied by φ(xˆ∗)− c ≥ φ(μ(nd; G∗)).
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and the equilibrium above under G∗∗,
∫ v
0
φ′′(x)S(x; HˆG∗∗)dx =
∫ xˆ∗
Υ(t′;F )
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)[(x− xˆ∗)F (t′) + S(xˆ∗; G∗)]}dx
+
∫ v
xˆ∗
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; G∗)}dx
≥
∫ xˆ∗
μ(nd;G∗)
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)[(x− xˆ∗)G∗(xˆ∗−) + S(xˆ∗; G∗)]}dx
+
∫ v
xˆ∗
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; G∗)}dx =
∫ v
0
φ′′(x)S(x; HG∗)dx,
where the inequality follows from Υ(t′; F ) ≤ μ(nd; G∗) and F (t′) < G∗(xˆ∗−). Ex ante firm value is thus
greater under G∗∗ than under G∗.
The equilibrium here identified under measurement G∗∗ is not necessarily the one where ex ante firm
value is maximal. However, we have shown that under G∗∗ there exists an equilibrium with greater ex
ante firm value than the regulator preferred equilibrium under G∗. Therefore, in the regulator preferred
equilibrium under G∗∗ ex ante firm value is at least as large.
Proof for Case φ(t′) − c ≥ φ(Υ(t′; F )). In this case, we have t′ ≥ xˆ(F ). Therefore, under G∗∗ the
regulator preferred subgame equilibrium has threshold xˆ∗∗ = xˆ(F ). In this equilibrium, the distribution of
posterior means from the market’s perspective is
HG∗∗(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, Υ(xˆ∗∗; F ))
q + (1− q)F (xˆ∗∗) if x ∈ [Υ(xˆ∗∗; F ), xˆ∗∗)
q + (1− q)F (x) if x ∈ [xˆ∗∗, t′)
q + (1− q)F (t′) if x ∈ [t′, xˆ∗)
q + (1− q)G∗(x) if x ∈ [xˆ∗, v]
. (B.21)
In the previous case, we have shown that
∫ v
0 φ
′′(x)S(x; HˆG∗∗)dx ≥
∫ v
0 φ
′′(x)S(x; HG∗)dx. To complete
the proof for this case, we now argue that
∫ v
0 φ
′′(x)S(x; HG∗∗)dx ≥
∫ v
0 φ
′′(x)S(x; HˆG∗∗)dx. From (B.20)
and (B.21), we see that the probability P(X ≥ xˆ∗) = (1 − q)F (t′), and the distribution of X|X ≥ xˆ∗ are
the same under both HˆG∗∗ and HG∗∗ . Therefore, E(φ(X)|X ≥ xˆ∗) and E(X|X < xˆ∗) are the same in
both equilibria. The distribution of X|X < xˆ∗ in the equilibrium with HG∗∗ is a mean-preserving spread of
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the distribution of X|X < xˆ∗ in the equilibrium with HˆG∗∗ , because the latter distribution is degenerate at
Υ(t′; F ). Since firm value is convex in the posterior mean, the ex ante expected firm value is greater under
HG∗∗ than under HˆG∗∗ .
Lemma B.9 xˆ∗ = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2).
Proof of Lemma B.9. If t = a2, then t ≤ xˆ∗ ≤ a2 implies xˆ∗ = t = a2 and the claim holds. So, for the
remainder of the proof, suppose that t < a2.
We can decompose the expectation
∫
[0,v] xdG
∗(x) =
∫
[0,xˆ∗) xdG
∗(x)+
∫
[xˆ∗,a2] xdG
∗(x)+
∫
(a2,v]
xdG∗(x).
Let us study separately each of these three terms:
-
∫
(a2,v]
xdG∗(x) = v − a2G∗(a2) − [S(v; G∗) − S(a2; G∗)] = v − a2F (a2) − [S(v; F ) − S(a2; F )] =∫ v
a2
xdF (x), where the first and third equalities follow from integration by parts, while the second equal-
ity from Lemma B.7 (G∗(a2) = F (a2)), from condition [MPS] (S(v; G∗) = S(v; F )), and from the
definition of a2 (S(a2; G∗) = S(a2; F )).
-
∫
[0,xˆ∗) xdG
∗(x) = xˆ∗G∗(xˆ∗−) − [S(t; G∗) +
∫ xˆ∗
t G
∗(x)dx] = xˆ∗F (t) − S(t; F ) − (xˆ∗ − t)F (t) =∫ t
0 xdF (x), where the first and third equalities follow from integration by parts, while the second equality
from Lemma B.8 (G∗(x) = F (t) for all x ∈ [t, xˆ∗)) and the definition of t (S(t; G∗) = S(t; F )).
-
∫
[xˆ∗,a2] xdG
∗(x) = a2G∗(a2) − xˆ∗G∗(xˆ∗−) −
∫ a2
xˆ∗ G
∗(x)dx = a2F (a2) − xˆ∗F (t) − (a2 − xˆ∗)F (a2) =
xˆ∗[F (a2) − F (t)], where the first equality follows from integration by parts, while the second equality
from Lemma B.8 (G∗(xˆ∗−) = F (t)) and Lemma B.7 (G∗(x) = F (a2) for all x ∈ [xˆ∗, a2]).
Since G∗ satisfies [MPS], ∫[0,v] xdG∗(x) = ∫ v0 xdF (x) = E(V ). Combining the three previous observa-
tions, ∫ t
0
xdF (x) + xˆ∗[F (a2)− F (t)] +
∫ v
a2
xdF (x) =
∫ v
0
xdF (x),
which yields the desired result xˆ∗ =
∫ a2
t xdF (x)/[F (a2)− F (t)] = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2).
Lemma B.10 φ(xˆ∗)− c = φ(μ(nd; G∗)).
Proof of Lemma B.10. In the proof of Lemma B.9, we have seen that
∫
[0,xˆ∗) xdG
∗(x) =
∫ xˆ∗
0 xdF (x).
By Lemma B.8, we know that G∗(xˆ∗−) = F (t). Combining these two facts, we conclude that μ(nd; G∗) =
63
Υ(t; F ). As explained at the beginning of this section, Lemmas B.6, B.7, and B.8 imply that the distribution
of posterior expectations HG∗ is given by (B.14). Then, the integral of the c.d.f. is
S(x; HG∗) =

0 if x ∈ [0, Υ(t; F ))
q(x− E(V )) + (1− q) [S(t; F ) + (x− t)F (t)] if x ∈ [Υ(t; F ), xˆ∗)
q(x− E(V )) + (1− q) [S(t) + (xˆ∗ − t)F (t) + (x− xˆ∗)F (a2)] if x ∈ [xˆ∗, a2]
q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; F ) if x ∈ (a2, v]
.
(B.22)
By way of contradiction, suppose that at the optimum the marginal discloser strictly prefers disclosure,
φ(xˆ∗) − c > φ(Υ(t; F )). We argue that if the inequality is strict, then ex ante firm value can be increased
strictly by changing the measurement system. We consider separately the cases t < a2 and t = a2.
Case t < a2. In this case, Lemma B.9 implies t < xˆ∗ < a2, because xˆ∗ = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2) and F
admits a density that is strictly positive over the entire support of V . Therefore, we can keep t fixed while
slightly decreasing a2 (and decreasing xˆ∗ = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2) accordingly), in a way that preserves the
inequality φ(xˆ∗)− c > φ(Υ(t; F )). The expected ex ante firm value is
∫ xˆ∗
Υ(t;F )
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)[S(t; F ) + (x− t)F (t)]}dx
+
∫ a2
xˆ∗
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)[S(a2; F )− (a2 − x)F (a2)]}dx
+
∫ v
a2
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; F )}dx,
(B.23)
where in the interval [xˆ∗, a2] we have substituted S(t)+(xˆ∗− t)F (t)+(x− xˆ∗)F (a2) = S(a2; F )− (a2−
x)F (a2), which follows from xˆ∗ = E(V |t ≤ V ≤ a2). The derivative of (B.23) with respect to a2 is
−(1− q)
∫ a2
xˆ∗
φ′′(x)(a2 − x)f(a2)dx < 0.
Since the derivative is negative, a decrease at the margin in a2 would increase the ex ante firm value. There-
fore, the original G∗ is not optimal.
Case t = a2. By Lemma B.9, in this case t = xˆ∗ = a2. By Lemma B.4, t > 0. So, we can keep
t = a2 = xˆ∗ and slightly decrease xˆ∗ while preserving the inequality φ(xˆ∗) − c > φ(Υ(xˆ∗; F )) (by
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continuity). The expected ex ante firm value is
∫ xˆ∗
Υ(xˆ∗;F )
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)[(x− xˆ∗)F (xˆ∗) + S(xˆ∗; F )]}dx
+
∫ v
xˆ∗
φ′′(x){q(x− E(V )) + (1− q)S(x; F )}dx.
(B.24)
The derivative of (B.24) with respect to xˆ∗ is
(1− q)
∫ xˆ∗
Υ(xˆ∗;F )
φ′′(x)(x− xˆ∗)f(xˆ∗)dx < 0,
where we have used the fact that q(Υ(xˆ∗; F )− xˆ∗) + (1− q)[(Υ(xˆ∗; F )− xˆ∗)F (xˆ∗) + S(xˆ∗)] = 0 by the
definition of Υ(xˆ∗; F ). Since the derivative is negative, a decrease of xˆ∗ at the margin increases ex ante firm
value, so the original measurement G∗ is not optimal.
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